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Approval Voting: A Multi-outcome Election

Author

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  • Haradhan Kumar Mohajan

    (Premier University, Chittagong, Bangladesh)

Abstract

This paper deals with approval voting and its critical strategy profile. Approval voting is a single winner voting system used for multi-candidate elections. In this method each voter may vote for as many of the candidates as she wishes that is the voter votes for all candidates of whom the voter approves. In Approval voting no ranking is involved, so all the votes have equal weight. Some scientific and engineering societies adopted approval voting but unfortunately yet has not adopted in any public election, despite efforts to institute it, so its success should be judge as mixed. The paper discusses aspects of approval voting and compares with some other voting rules. Approval voting may elect Condorcet winners or Condorcet losers. In addition the paper is enlightened to stability of approval voting outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Haradhan Kumar Mohajan, 2011. "Approval Voting: A Multi-outcome Election," KASBIT Business Journals (KBJ), Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari Institute of Technology (KASBIT), vol. 4, pages 77-88, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksb:journl:v:4:y:2011:p:77-88
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    File URL: http://kasbit.edu.pk/KBJVol4/7-Approval%20Voting%20A%20Multi-outcome%20Election-Haradhan%20Kumar.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. López-Pérez, Raúl & Vorsatz, Marc, 2010. "On approval and disapproval: Theory and experiments," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 527-541, August.
    2. Ahn, David S. & Oliveros, Santiago, 2016. "Approval voting and scoring rules with common values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 304-310.
    3. Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 2010. "Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), Handbook on Approval Voting, chapter 0, pages 19-37, Springer.
    4. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2014. "Satisfaction Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Rudolf Fara & Dennis Leech & Maurice Salles (ed.), Voting Power and Procedures, edition 127, pages 323-346, Springer.
    5. Brams, Steven J & Nagel, Jack H, 1991. "Approval Voting in Practice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 71(1-2), pages 1-17, August.
    6. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Approval Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 831-847, September.
    7. Robert J. Weber, 1995. "Approval Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 39-49, Winter.
    8. repec:esx:essedp:732 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Islam, Jamal & Mohajan, Haradhan & Moolio, Pahlaj, 2010. "Methods of voting system and manipulation of voting," MPRA Paper 50854, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 May 2010.
    10. Peter C. Fishburn & John D. C. Little, 1988. "An Experiment in Approval Voting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(5), pages 555-568, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mohajan, Devajit & Mohajan, Haradhan, 2023. "Economic Aspects of Profit Maximization if Cost of Principal Raw Material Increases," MPRA Paper 117453, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Mar 2023.
    2. Mohajan, Devajit & Mohajan, Haradhan, 2023. "The Responses of an Organization for the Increase in Wage Rates: Profit Maximization Cases," MPRA Paper 118238, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Jun 2023.
    3. Mohajan, Devajit & Mohajan, Haradhan, 2023. "Economic Investigation of Lagrange Multiplier if Cost of Inputs and Budget Size of a Firm Increase: A Profit Maximization Endeavor," MPRA Paper 117993, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 May 2023.
    4. Mohajan, Devajit & Mohajan, Haradhan, 2023. "Various Problems Arise in Industrial Economics If Wage Rate Increases: A Study for Nonlinear Budget Constraint," MPRA Paper 117553, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 04 Apr 2023.
    5. Mohajan, Devajit & Mohajan, Haradhan, 2023. "Effects of Various Inputs for Increased Interest Rate of Capital: A Nonlinear Budget Constraint Consideration," MPRA Paper 118134, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 May 2023.
    6. Mohajan, Devajit & Mohajan, Haradhan, 2023. "An Economical Study When Cost of Irregular Raw Materials of an Industry Increases for Nonlinear Budget Constraint," MPRA Paper 118176, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 May 2023.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Condorcet winner; Strategy profile; AV outcomes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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