IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ksa/szemle/1499.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Koopetíció - néhány elméleti és empirikus eredmény egy kooperatív elemeket tartalmazó versenyzői helyzetről
[Coopetition": Some theoretical and empirical results of a competitive situation with cooperative features]

Author

Listed:
  • Kőhegyi, Gergely
  • Selei, Adrienn
  • Kiss, Hubert János
  • Zsoldos, János

Abstract

A gondolat, amely szerint a vállalatok közötti verseny és együttműködés egyszerre van jelen az üzleti gyakorlatban, kiemelt figyelemet kap az üzleti tudományok területén, ugyanakkor meglehetősen kevés elméleti modell született a probléma megjelenítésére. A tanulmányban egy olyan modellkeret megalkotására teszünk kísérletet, amelyben az első időszakban a vállalatok arról döntenek, hogy mekkora összeggel járuljanak hozzá egy olyan közös alaphoz, amely révén vélhetően a piac bővül, így ez a szakasz egy folytonos közjószágjátékhoz hasonló helyzetet hoz létre. Ezt követően, a második időszakban a vállalatok Cournot-versenyt folytatnak. Ebben a kétlépcsős szekvenciális játékként értelmezhető keretben megvizsgáljuk az egyensúly tulajdonságait különböző feltételek mellett. Látható lesz, hogy az egyensúlyi hozzájárulási szintek általában pozitívak, sőt többnyire megegyeznek a maximális lehetséges összeggel. Megvizsgáljuk azt is, hogy az optimális hozzájárulási szintek hogyan viszonyulnak a vállalatok összprofitját, illetve a társadalmi jólétet maximalizáló hozzájárulási szintekhez. A modellünk egy speciális esetében feltesszük, hogy a közös alaphoz való hozzájárulás csökkenti a technológiai fejlesztések által termelési költségek csökkentésére fordítható forrásokat, felerősítve ezáltal a verseny és együttműködés között feszülő ellentéteket. E modellt egy laboratóriumi kísérlet során teszteljük. A kapott eredmények alátámasztják a modell hozzájárulással kapcsolatos predikcióit. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: C70, C90, D21, D22, L20.

Suggested Citation

  • Kőhegyi, Gergely & Selei, Adrienn & Kiss, Hubert János & Zsoldos, János, 2014. "Koopetíció - néhány elméleti és empirikus eredmény egy kooperatív elemeket tartalmazó versenyzői helyzetről [Coopetition": Some theoretical and empirical results of a competitive situation wit," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 1000-1021.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1499
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.kszemle.hu/tartalom/letoltes.php?id=1499
    Download Restriction: Registration and subscription. 3-month embargo period to non-subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mahito Okura, 2007. "Coopetitive Strategies of Japanese Insurance Firms A Game-Theory Approach," International Studies of Management & Organization, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(2), pages 53-69, January.
    2. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2008:i:21:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Bochet, Olivier & Page, Talbot & Putterman, Louis, 2006. "Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 11-26, May.
    4. Pilsik Choi & Rosanna Garcia & Colette Friedrich, 2010. "The drivers for collective horizontal coopetition: a case study of screwcap initiatives in the international wine industry," International Journal of Human Rights and Constitutional Studies, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 1(3), pages 271-290.
    5. Duc De Ngo & Mahito Okura, 2008. "Coopetition in a Mixed Duopoly Market," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(21), pages 1-9.
    6. Francis Bloch, 1995. "Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 537-556, Autumn.
    7. Keisuke Hattori & Takeshi Yoshikawa, 2016. "Free entry and social inefficiency under co-opetition," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 118(2), pages 97-119, June.
    8. Carl Shapiro, 1989. "The Theory of Business Strategy," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(1), pages 125-137, Spring.
    9. Huck, Steffen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Oechssler, Jorg, 2004. "Two are few and four are many: number effects in experimental oligopolies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 435-446, April.
    10. Duc De Ngo, 2008. "Coopetition in a Mixed Duopoly Market," Post-Print halshs-00363470, HAL.
    11. Dong-Wook Song, 2003. "Port co-opetition in concept and practice," Maritime Policy & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(1), pages 29-44, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jóna, György, 2017. "Versenytársak együttműködésének hatása a regionális gazdasági fejlődésre [Impacts of rivals cooperation on regional economic development]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 54-73.
    2. Kiss, Hubert János & Horn, Dániel & Khayouti, Sára, 2021. "Versengeni és együttműködni? Egy reprezentatív felmérés tanulságai [Competing and cooperating? Lessons of a representative survey]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 966-986.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Zhu, Zheng & Xu, Ailing & He, Qiao-Chu & Yang, Hai, 2021. "Competition between the transportation network company and the government with subsidies to public transit riders," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    2. Yuanfang Lin & Sandeep Krishnamurthy, 2017. "Generic and Brand Advertising Strategies Under Inter-Industry Competition," Customer Needs and Solutions, Springer;Institute for Sustainable Innovation and Growth (iSIG), vol. 4(1), pages 18-27, September.
    3. Anthony Ziegelmeyer & Katinka Pantz, 2005. "Collaborative Networks in Experimental Triopolies," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-38, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    4. Caplan, Arthur J., 2023. "Regulating coopetition in an EV charging market," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
    5. Waichman, Israel & Requate, Till & Siang, Ch’ng Kean, 2014. "Communication in Cournot competition: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 1-16.
    6. Paul Chiambaretto & David Massé & Nicola Mirc, 2019. "“All for One and One for All?” - Knowledge broker roles in managing tensions of internal coopetition: The Ubisoft case," Post-Print hal-02104540, HAL.
    7. Roux, Catherine & Thöni, Christian, 2015. "Collusion among many firms: The disciplinary power of targeted punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 83-93.
    8. Chiambaretto, Paul & Massé, David & Mirc, Nicola, 2019. "“All for One and One for All?” - Knowledge broker roles in managing tensions of internal coopetition: The Ubisoft case," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 584-600.
    9. Kavirathna, Chathumi Ayanthi & Kawasaki, Tomoya & Hanaoka, Shinya & Bandara, Yapa Mahinda, 2020. "Cooperation with a vessel transfer policy for coopetition among container terminals in a single port," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 1-12.
    10. Zakaria Babutsidze & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2019. "Digital Communication and Swift Trust," Post-Print halshs-02409314, HAL.
    11. Johan Graafland, 2020. "Competition in technology and innovation, motivation crowding, and environmental policy," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 27(1), pages 137-145, January.
    12. Bose, Neha & Sgroi, Daniel, 2019. "The Role of Theory of Mind and “Small Talk” Communication in Strategic Decision-Making," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 409, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    13. Petra Nieken & Sven Walther, 2024. "Honesty in Virtual Communication," CESifo Working Paper Series 11094, CESifo.
    14. Fangfang Tan, 2008. "Punishment in a Linear Public Good Game with Productivity Heterogeneity," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 269-293, September.
    15. Topi Miettinen & Sigrid Suetens, 2008. "Communication and Guilt in a Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(6), pages 945-960, December.
    16. Santiago Sánchez-Pagés, 2007. "Endogenous coalition formation in contests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(2), pages 139-163, September.
    17. De Geest, Lawrence R. & Kingsley, David C., 2021. "Norm enforcement with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 403-430.
    18. Almeida, Sergio, 2023. "Punishment credibility and cooperation in public good games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    19. Kimbrough, E.O. & Vostroknutov, A., 2012. "Rules, rule-following and cooperation," Research Memorandum 053, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    20. Thoron, Sylvie & Sol, Emmanuel & Willinger, Marc, 2009. "Do binding agreements solve the social dilemma?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1271-1282, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1499. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Odon Sok (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.kszemle.hu .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.