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Evidence, causality, and sequential choice

Author

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  • Gerard J. Rothfus

    (The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)

Abstract

Philosophers’ two favorite accounts of rational choice, Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) and Causal Decision Theory (CDT), each face a number of serious objections. Especially troubling are the recent charges that these theories are dynamically inconsistent. I note here that, under the epistemic assumptions that validate these charges, every decision theory that satisfies a pair of attractive postulates is doomed to a similar fate and then survey various lessons rational choice theorists might opt to draw from this.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerard J. Rothfus, 2024. "Evidence, causality, and sequential choice," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 97(4), pages 613-636, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:97:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s11238-024-09990-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09990-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. McClennen,Edward F., 1990. "Rationality and Dynamic Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521360470, September.
    2. Katie Steele, 2010. "What are the minimal requirements of rational choice? Arguments from the sequential-decision setting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 463-487, April.
    3. Cubitt, Robin P, 1996. "Rational Dynamic Choice and Expected Utility Theory," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(1), pages 1-19, January.
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