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Dynamic Choice and Timing-Independence: an experimental investigation

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  • John Hey
  • Massimo Paradiso.

Abstract

Timing-independence implies that individuals are indifferent between a sequential choice problem and a planned choice problem which are strategically equivalent except for the timing of resolution of the uncertainty. This paper reports an experiment in which we investigate whether the timing of resolution of the uncertainty affects individual preferences. We elicit individual preferences for three strategically equivalent decisions problems. The experimental results suggest that timing- independence is an inappropriate assumption of individual preferences. The paper discusses possible implications of such findings.

Suggested Citation

  • John Hey & Massimo Paradiso., "undated". "Dynamic Choice and Timing-Independence: an experimental investigation," Discussion Papers 99/26, Department of Economics, University of York.
  • Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:99/26
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    File URL: https://www.york.ac.uk/media/economics/documents/discussionpapers/1999/9926.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nathalie Etchart, 2002. "Adequate Moods for non-eu Decision Making in a Sequential Framework," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 1-28, February.

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