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Rationality, preference satisfaction and anomalous intentions: why rational choice theory is not self-defeating

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  • Roberto Fumagalli

    (King’s College London
    London School of Economics
    University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

The critics of rational choice theory (henceforth, RCT) frequently claim that RCT is self-defeating in the sense that agents who abide by RCT’s prescriptions are less successful in satisfying their preferences than they would be if they abided by some normative theory of choice other than RCT. In this paper, I combine insights from philosophy of action, philosophy of mind and the normative foundations of RCT to rebut this often-made criticism. I then explicate the implications of my thesis for the wider philosophical debate concerning the normativity of RCT for both ideal agents who can form and revise their intentions instantly without cognitive costs and real-life agents who have limited control over the formation and the dynamics of their own intentions.

Suggested Citation

  • Roberto Fumagalli, 2021. "Rationality, preference satisfaction and anomalous intentions: why rational choice theory is not self-defeating," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(3), pages 337-356, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:91:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s11238-021-09801-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-021-09801-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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