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Vertical Restraints, the Sylvania Case, and China’s Antitrust Enforcement

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  • Zhiyong Liu

    (Indiana State University)

  • Yue Qiao

    (Shandong University)

Abstract

We briefly review the relevant economic theories and legal treatment of vertical restraints, and especially focus on the 1977 landmark case of Sylvania and its possible influence on China’s antitrust enforcement on vertical restraints. China’s competition policy, and particularly its antimonopoly law, does not explicitly instruct with respect to the enforcement approach (per se versus rule of reason) toward vertical restraints. But from an overview of China’s recent antitrust cases, we find that there is a division in the approaches taken by public versus private enforcement: Even though the administrative enforcement is more inclined to the application of per se prohibitions (or the application of the EU-style prohibition-plus-exemption approach), it seems that a rule of reason is the (increasingly) prevailing approach that is taken by the courts.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhiyong Liu & Yue Qiao, 2017. "Vertical Restraints, the Sylvania Case, and China’s Antitrust Enforcement," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 51(2), pages 193-215, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:51:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11151-017-9587-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-017-9587-7
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    Cited by:

    1. Jeroen Hinloopen & Stephen Martin, 2017. "Introduction to the Special Issue," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 51(2), pages 147-149, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Vertical restraints; Sylvania; Antitrust; Antitrust enforcement; Competition policy; Per se rule; Rule of reason;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law

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