New Wine into Old Wineskins: Recent Developments in China’s Competition Policy Against Monopolistic/Collusive Agreements
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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-012-9344-x
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Cited by:
- Zhiyong Liu & Yue Qiao, 2017. "Vertical Restraints, the Sylvania Case, and China’s Antitrust Enforcement," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 51(2), pages 193-215, September.
- Pingping Shan & Guofu Tan & Simon Wilkie & Michael Williams, 2012. "China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: What is the Welfare Standard?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 41(1), pages 31-52, August.
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More about this item
Keywords
Antitrust; Competition policy; Monopolistic agreements; Collusion; Cartels; L1; L4; K2;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
- K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
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