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Minimum resale price maintenance in EU in the aftermath of the US Leegin decision

Author

Listed:
  • Elif Cemre Hazıroğlu

    (Bilkent University)

  • Semih Gökatalay

    (Middle East Technical University)

Abstract

Leegin decision of the Supreme Court in 2007 affirmed that minimum RPM was to be evaluated under the rule of reason henceforth. Conversely, minimum RPM retains its position as a hard-core restraint in EU’s BER 2010 and the De Minimis Notice. The limited amount of case law reveal that in the absence of certain factors, such as significant market power of the parties, minimum RPM is unlikely to result in the detriment of consumers. Consequently, despite the retention of the maintenance of the single market as a significant aim in EU competition policy, minimum RPM practices are entitled to a more lenient approach, if the ultimate aim is to attain consumer welfare as stated by the Commission and through most judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

Suggested Citation

  • Elif Cemre Hazıroğlu & Semih Gökatalay, 2016. "Minimum resale price maintenance in EU in the aftermath of the US Leegin decision," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 45-71, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:42:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s10657-015-9517-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-015-9517-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Zhiyong Liu & Yue Qiao, 2017. "Vertical Restraints, the Sylvania Case, and China’s Antitrust Enforcement," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 51(2), pages 193-215, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antitrust law; US; EU; Art. 101 TFEU; Dr. Miles; Leegin; Minimum resale price maintenance; Hard-core restraints; Per se; Rule of reason; Appreciability standard; De Minimis notice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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