Appropriate contract durations in the German markets for on-line reserve capacity
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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-010-9141-0
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Citations
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Cited by:
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"Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power,"
Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).
- Heim, Sven & Götz, Georg, 2013. "Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-035, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Sven Heim & Georg Götz, 2021. "Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power," Post-Print hal-03519694, HAL.
- Sven Heim & Georg Götz, 2013. "Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? - Evidence from Germany’s market for reserve power," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201324, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Michael G. Pollitt & Karim L. Anaya, 2021.
"Competition in Markets for Ancillary Services? The Implications of Rising Distributed Generation,"
The Energy Journal, , vol. 42(1_suppl), pages 1-2, June.
- Michael G. Pollitt & Karim L. Anaya, 2020. "Competition in Markets for Ancillary Services? The Implications of Rising Distributed Generation," The Energy Journal, , vol. 41(1_suppl), pages 5-32, June.
- Michael G. Pollitt & Karim L. Anaya, 2021. "Competition in Markets for Ancillary Services? The Implications of Rising Distributed Generation," The Energy Journal, , vol. 42(1_suppl), pages 1-28, June.
- Michael G. Pollitt and Karim L. Anaya, 2020. "Competition in Markets for Ancillary Services? The Implications of Rising Distributed Generation," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Special I).
- Michael Pollitt, 2019. "Competition in Markets for Ancillary Services? The implications of rising distributed generation," Working Papers EPRG1928, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
- Pollitt, M. & Anaya, K., 2019. "Competition in Markets for Ancillary Services? The implications of rising distributed generation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1973, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Sebastian Just & Christoph Weber, 2012. "Strategic Behavior in the German Balancing Energy Mechanism: Incentives, Evidence, Costs and Solutions," EWL Working Papers 1204, University of Duisburg-Essen, Chair for Management Science and Energy Economics, revised Oct 2012.
- Furtwängler, Christian & Weber, Christoph, 2019. "Spot and reserve market equilibria and the influence of new reserve market participants," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 408-421.
- Joos, Michael & Staffell, Iain, 2018. "Short-term integration costs of variable renewable energy: Wind curtailment and balancing in Britain and Germany," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 45-65.
- Märkle-Huß, Joscha & Feuerriegel, Stefan & Neumann, Dirk, 2018. "Contract durations in the electricity market: Causal impact of 15min trading on the EPEX SPOT market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 367-378.
- Hu, Jing & Harmsen, Robert & Crijns-Graus, Wina & Worrell, Ernst & van den Broek, Machteld, 2018. "Identifying barriers to large-scale integration of variable renewable electricity into the electricity market: A literature review of market design," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 81(P2), pages 2181-2195.
- Christian Furtwaengler & Christoph Weber, "undated". "Reserve Provision by CHP Units and its Impact on Equilibria in Spot and Reserve Markets," EWL Working Papers 1803, University of Duisburg-Essen, Chair for Management Science and Energy Economics.
- Casimir Lorenz & Clemens Gerbaulet, 2017. "Wind Providing Balancing Reserves: An Application to the German Electricity System of 2025," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1655, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Schillinger, Moritz, 2019. "Balancing Market Design and Opportunity Cost - The Swiss Case," Working papers 2019/14, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
- Richter, Jan, 2011. "A Unique Competitive Equilibrium on Interdependent Spot Electricity and Reserve Capacity Markets," EWI Working Papers 2011-9, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI).
- Fridrik Mar Baldursson & Julia Bellenbaum & Lenja Niesen & Christoph Weber, 2022. "Welfare optimal reliability and reserve provision in electricity markets with increasing shares of renewable energy sources," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 47-79, December.
- Sebastian Just & Christoph Weber, 2015. "Strategic behavior in the German balancing energy mechanism: incentives, evidence, costs and solutions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 218-243, October.
- Xu, Bing & Nayak, Amar & Gray, David & Ouenniche, Jamal, 2016. "Assessing energy business cases implemented in the North Sea Region and strategy recommendations," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 360-371.
- Schillinger, Moritz, 2020. "Balancing-market design and opportunity cost: The Swiss case," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Electricity markets; Contract duration; Power systems reserve; Ancillary service; Primary reserve; Secondary reserve; Spinning reserve; Opportunity costs; Equilibrium model; L94; L11; D41; D44;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
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