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Eine europäische Bemessungsgrundlage für die Körperschaftsteuer? Konzeption und ordnungsökonomische Analyse / Conceptual design and constitutional economics analysis of a European tax base for corporate taxation

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  • Melle Marco C.

Abstract

Summary For quite some time the European Commission is agitating for a common assessment base for corporate taxation of EU tax resident entities. The draft for a council directive from March, 16th, 2011 is a concrete proposal for a uniform determination of taxable profits in order to be approved by the national economic and finance ministers in the Ecofin - the tax world is eagerly waiting for a resolution. A major aim of this partial harmonisation is to allow an easy cross-border offsetting of tax profits and losses. The final right to tax remains with the Member States what shall ensure a formula apportionment. The present paper wants to add to the technical discussion about the concrete CCCTB design some fundamental thoughts on this intended modification of the European tax law system. It shall be illustrated from a constitutional economics perspective that the CCCTB would be a welcome intervention for more tax transparency and allocative efficiency due to a use-oriented collection which still would allow promoting a location by corporation tax.

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  • Melle Marco C., 2014. "Eine europäische Bemessungsgrundlage für die Körperschaftsteuer? Konzeption und ordnungsökonomische Analyse / Conceptual design and constitutional economics analysis of a European tax base for corpora," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 65(1), pages 133-156, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:65:y:2014:i:1:p:133-156:n:9
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2014-0109
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