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Special Versus General Elections and Composition of the Voters: Evidence From Louisiana School Tax Elections

Author

Listed:
  • Gary M. Pecquet

    (Baton Rouge, Louisiana)

  • R. Morris Coats

    (Nicholls State University)

  • Steven T. Yen

    (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

Abstract

Using Louisiana school board property tax elections from the past decade, the authors study the question of whether or not special elections tend to produce lower turnout and a greater percentage of yes votes than do general elections. With the problem focusing on the choice of voting yes, voting no, or abstaining from voting, modified minimum chi-square methods are used in the analysis. The authors find that opposition to local school taxes increases with turnout. They also find that turnout is affected by the size of the tax, by the presence or absence of other taxes on the ballot, and by the presence or absence of state or federal matters on the same ballot. Both the inclusion of state or federal issues (or candidates) on the ballot and a higher tax rate lead to increased relative opposition at the polls.

Suggested Citation

  • Gary M. Pecquet & R. Morris Coats & Steven T. Yen, 1996. "Special Versus General Elections and Composition of the Voters: Evidence From Louisiana School Tax Elections," Public Finance Review, , vol. 24(2), pages 131-147, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:24:y:1996:i:2:p:131-147
    DOI: 10.1177/109114219602400201
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Randall Holcombe & Lawrence Kenny, 2008. "Does restricting choice in referenda enable governments to spend more?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 87-101, July.
    2. Lacombe, Donald J. & Coats, R. Morris & Shughart II, William F. & Karahan, Gökhan, 2016. "Corruption and Voter Turnout: A Spatial Econometric Approach," Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association, vol. 46(2), December.
    3. Craig Maher & Mark Skidmore, 2008. "Changing Education Finance Policy, School Referenda Activity, and Success Rates," Public Finance Review, , vol. 36(4), pages 431-455, July.
    4. Gill, H. Leroy & Haurin, Donald R., 2001. "The choice of tax base by local authorities: voter preferences, special interest groups, and tax base diversification," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 733-749, November.

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