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Two Politicians, A Pac, And How They Interact: Two Extensive Form Games

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  • Susan A. Edelman

Abstract

Two sequential games of the interactions among a PAC and two politicians contesting the same office are developed, and their subgame perfect equilibria are characterized. The politicians have distinct ideal points in policy space, and this drives the result that the policy platforms they campaign on are not identical. The PAC always contributes only to the politician whose platform is closest to the PAC's ideal point, who is the politician whose ideal point is closest to the PAC's ideal point; as a result, both politicians’policy platforms are closer to the PAC's ideal point. The sequence of play does not qualitatively affect the outcome, but the PAC has a second mover advantage. Exogenous shocks to the probabilities of winning only modify the basic outcome.

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  • Susan A. Edelman, 1992. "Two Politicians, A Pac, And How They Interact: Two Extensive Form Games," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 289-306, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:4:y:1992:i:3:p:289-306
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1992.tb00089.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Shiou Shieh & Wan-Hsiang Pan, 2010. "Individual campaign contributions in a Downsian model: expressive and instrumental motives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 405-416, December.
    2. Reuben E., 2002. "Interest groups and politics: The need to concentrate on group formation," Public Economics 0212001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Platikanova, Petya, 2017. "Investor-legislators: Tax holiday for politically connected firms," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 380-398.
    4. Manfred Dix & Rudy Santore, 2003. "Campaign Contributions with Swing Voters," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 285-301, November.

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