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Bureaucratic institutional design: the case of the Italian NHS

Author

Listed:
  • Silvia Fedeli

    (Sapienza - Università di Roma)

  • Leone Leonida

    (King’s College of London)

  • Michele Santoni

    (Università degli Studi di Milano)

Abstract

We propose a model where a regional government’s choice of the number of bureaucratic agencies operating in a region depends upon the degree of substitutability and complementarity of the bureaucratic services being demanded. We show that, if the government perceives the citizens’ demand as a demand for substitutable services, it will choose provision by two independent agencies. If the government perceives the citizens’ demand as a demand for complementary services, it will choose provision by a single consolidated agency. Exogenous shocks to the number of citizens amplify these incentives. Evidence from the Italian National Health Service (NHS) supports this hypothesis. Results show a positive effect of proxies of substitutable services on the number of regional local health authorities and a negative effect of proxies of complementary services. The major immigration amnesties, taken as shocks to the number of citizens entitled to the service, magnify these effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Silvia Fedeli & Leone Leonida & Michele Santoni, 2018. "Bureaucratic institutional design: the case of the Italian NHS," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(3), pages 265-285, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:177:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0569-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0569-6
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bureaucratic institutional design; Public local health authorities; Consolidation and decentralization of local health authorities; Italian NHS;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises

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