IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v100y1999i3-4p253-70.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Competing Bureaus and Politicians: A Compliance Approach to the Diversion of Public Funds

Author

Listed:
  • Fedeli, Silvia

Abstract

This article analyzes the effects of the compliance relationship between the governing party and two competing bureaus producing differentiated goods. We assume that the three players simultaneously and independently take their decision in terms of production and rents with perfect knowledge of each other's strategies. Unlike Niskanen's competitive results, which are invariant with respect to the monopoly solution and only depend on the characteristics of the review process, here the budgetary equilibrium changes depending on the nature of the goods supplied by the competing bureaus and is affected both by their demand and cost conditions and by the resources available to the governing party. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Fedeli, Silvia, 1999. "Competing Bureaus and Politicians: A Compliance Approach to the Diversion of Public Funds," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 100(3-4), pages 253-270, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:100:y:1999:i:3-4:p:253-70
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0048-5829/contents
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Christoph Gwosć & Gregor Van Der Beek, 2003. "Principles for a European Union's Public Debt," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 23-37, March.
    2. Silvia Fedeli & Michele Santoni, 2001. "Endogenous institutions in bureaucratic compliance games," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 203-229, November.
    3. Silvia Fedeli & Michele Santoni, 2006. "The Government's Choice of Bureaucratic Organisation: An Application to Italian State Museums," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 30(1), pages 41-72, March.
    4. Silvia Fedeli & Leone Leonida & Michele Santoni, 2018. "Bureaucratic institutional design: the case of the Italian NHS," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(3), pages 265-285, December.
    5. Elton Beqiraj & Silvia Fedeli & Massimiliano Tancioni, 2019. "Bureaucratic Reshuffling and Efficiency: Do n-Competing Bureaus Determine Inefficient Results?," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 7(10), pages 1-12, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:100:y:1999:i:3-4:p:253-70. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.