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Minor candidates as kingmakers

Author

Listed:
  • Akifumi Ishihara

    (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies)

  • Shintaro Miura

    (Kanagawa University)

Abstract

We consider a sequential entry model with three candidates who cannot commit to any policy announcement during the campaign. The study focuses on how a minor candidate, who wins only when unopposed, influences the electoral outcome. We show that unless the Condorcet winner (i.e., the winner in every pairwise vote) coincides with the grand winner (i.e., the winner of the three-candidate competition), the minor candidate is a kingmaker in the sense that his preferred rival wins regardless of the order of the entry decisions. To influence the outcome, the minor candidate could either (i) enter strategically without any chance to win, or (ii) enter if and only if the Condorcet winner already has entered.

Suggested Citation

  • Akifumi Ishihara & Shintaro Miura, 2017. "Minor candidates as kingmakers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(3), pages 253-263, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:170:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-016-0393-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0393-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Akifumi Ishihara, 2020. "Strategic candidacy for political compromise in party politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(3), pages 389-408, July.

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