IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jecrev/v58y2007i4p423-442.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Strategic Candidacy And Single‐Peakedness

Author

Listed:
  • YUSUKE SAMEJIMA

Abstract

In elections, the voting outcomes are affected by strategic entries of candidates. We study a class of voting rules immune to strategic candidacy. Dutta et al. (2001) show that such rules satisfying unanimity are dictatorial if all orderings of candidates are admissible for voters’ preferences. When voters’ preferences are single‐peaked over a political spectrum, there exist non‐dictatorial rules immune to strategic candidacy. An example is the rule selecting the m‐th peak from the left among the peaks of voters’ preferences, where m is any natural number no more than the number of voters. We show that immunity from strategic candidacy with basic axioms fully characterizes the family of the m‐th leftmost peak rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Yusuke Samejima, 2007. "Strategic Candidacy And Single‐Peakedness," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 58(4), pages 423-442, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:58:y:2007:i:4:p:423-442
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2007.00381.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2007.00381.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2007.00381.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Akifumi Ishihara & Shintaro Miura, 2017. "Minor candidates as kingmakers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(3), pages 253-263, March.
    2. Boniface Mbih & Issofa Moyouwou & Abdoul Aziz Ndiaye, 2009. "Parliamentary voting rules and strategic candidacy," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(2), pages 1371-1379.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:58:y:2007:i:4:p:423-442. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/jeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.