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Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying

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  • John M. de Figueiredo
  • Brian Kelleher Richter

Abstract

This essay identifies the empirical facts about lobbying which are generally agreed upon in the literature. It then discusses challenges to empirical research in lobbying and provides examples of empirical methods that can be employed to overcome these challenges--with an emphasis on statistical measurement, identification, and casual inference. The essay then discusses the advantages, disadvantages, and effective use of the main types of data available for research in lobbying. It closes by discussing a number of open questions for researchers in the field and avenues for future work to advance the empirical research in lobbying.

Suggested Citation

  • John M. de Figueiredo & Brian Kelleher Richter, 2013. "Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying," NBER Working Papers 19698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19698
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    1. Unsal, Omer & Hassan, M. Kabir & Zirek, Duygu, 2016. "Corporate lobbying, CEO political ideology and firm performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 126-149.
    2. Murray, Cameron K. & Frijters, Paul, 2015. "Clean Money in a Dirty System: Relationship Networks and Land Rezoning in Queensland," IZA Discussion Papers 9028, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Jan Klingelhöfer, 2019. "Lobbying And Elections," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 1-17, January.
    4. Unsal, Omer & Kabir Hassan, M. & Zirek, Duygu, 2017. "Corporate lobbying and labor relations: Evidence from employee-level litigations," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 411-441.
    5. Omer Unsal & M. Kabir Hassan & William J. Hippler, 2016. "Lobbying in Finance Industry: Evidence from US Banking System," NFI Working Papers 2017-WP-03, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    6. Prithwiraj Choudhury, 2017. "Innovation Outcomes in a Distributed Organization: Intrafirm Mobility and Access to Resources," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(2), pages 339-354, April.
    7. Shirodkar, Vikrant & Batsakis, Georgios & Konara, Palitha & Mohr, Alexander, 2022. "Disentangling the effects of domestic corporate political activity and political connections on firms’ internationalisation: Evidence from US retail MNEs," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1).
    8. Murray, Cameron K. & Frijters, Paul, 2016. "Clean money, dirty system: Connected landowners capture beneficial land rezoning," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 99-114.
    9. Mosk, Thomas, 2021. "Captured by financial institutions? New academic insights for EU policy makers," SAFE White Paper Series 77, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.

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    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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