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The social gains from exchanging votes: A simulation approach

Author

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  • Dennis Mueller
  • Geoffrey Philpotts
  • Jaroslav Vanek

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Suggested Citation

  • Dennis Mueller & Geoffrey Philpotts & Jaroslav Vanek, 1972. "The social gains from exchanging votes: A simulation approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 55-79, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:13:y:1972:i:1:p:55-79
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01718852
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tullock, Gordon, 1970. "A Simple Algebraic Logrolling Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 419-426, June.
    2. Wilson, Robert, 1969. "An Axiomatic Model of Logrolling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(3), pages 331-341, June.
    3. Edwin Haefele, 1970. "Coalitions, minority representation, and vote-trading probabilities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 75-90, March.
    4. James Miller, 1969. "A program for direct and proxy voting in the legislative process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 107-113, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, 2012. "Politics with(out) Coase," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 59(2), pages 175-187, July.
    2. Alessandra Casella & Antonin Macé, 2021. "Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 57-86, August.
    3. Menezes, Mozart B.C. & da Silveira, Giovani J.C. & Drezner, Zvi, 2016. "Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and Approval Voting compared with Median and Coverage locations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 253(1), pages 195-203.
    4. Pivato, Marcus, 2006. "Approximate implementation of Relative Utilitarianism via Groves-Clarke pivotal voting with virtual money," MPRA Paper 627, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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