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A model of regulatory agency behavior

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  • Milton Russell
  • Robert Shelton

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  • Milton Russell & Robert Shelton, 1974. "A model of regulatory agency behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 47-62, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:20:y:1974:i:1:p:47-62
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01718177
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul W. MacAvoy, 1970. "The Effectiveness of the Federal Power Commission," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 1(2), pages 271-303, Autumn.
    2. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    3. William J. Baumol & Alvin K. Klevorick, 1970. "Input Choices and Rate-of Return Regulation: An Overview of the Discussion," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 1(2), pages 162-190, Autumn.
    4. Hilton, George W, 1972. "The Basic Behavior of Regulatory Commissions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(2), pages 47-54, May.
    5. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    6. Wilson, Robert, 1969. "An Axiomatic Model of Logrolling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(3), pages 331-341, June.
    7. Kitch, Edmund W & Isaacson, Marc & Kasper, Daniel, 1971. "The Regulation of Taxicabs in Chicago," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(2), pages 285-350, October.
    8. Gordon R. Corey, 1971. "The Averch and Johnson Proposition: A Critical Analysis," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 358-373, Spring.
    9. Noel M. Edelson, 1971. "Resource Allocation and the Regulated Firm: A Reply to Bailey and Malone," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 374-378, Spring.
    10. Kafoglis, Milton Z, 1969. "Output of the Restrained Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 583-589, Part I Se.
    11. Elizabeth E. Bailey & John C. Malone, 1970. "Resource Allocation and the Regulated Firm," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 1(1), pages 129-142, Spring.
    12. David K. Eiteman, 1962. "Interdependence Of Utility Rate‐Base Type, Permitted Rate Of Return, And Utility Earnings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 17(1), pages 38-52, March.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Arthur Schram & Aljaž Ule, 2024. "Regulatory independence may limit electoral holdup but entrench capture," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 198(3), pages 403-425, March.
    3. Mirucki, Jean, 1980. "Comportement de l'entreprise réglementée: étude de l'hypothèse Averch-Johnson [Behavior of the Regulated Firm: A Study of the Averch-Johnson Hypothesis]," MPRA Paper 27669, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 1982.

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