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Pressure groups and public investment decisions: A note

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  • David Shapiro

Abstract

No model of public investment is complete without introducing the effects of the interaction between pressure groups and agency officials. The contention that public managers attempt to extend control over resources is a convenient starting point for the analysis. The logrolling models that describe the trading among pressure groups describe the end point of the process. Somehow the gap in between must be filled by an analysis of the role of pressure groups in the design and promotion of public projects and programs. Only then can analysts pretend to have a reasonably complete model of public investment decisions. This note is presented as a possible beginning in the quest for such a model. Copyright Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1971

Suggested Citation

  • David Shapiro, 1971. "Pressure groups and public investment decisions: A note," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 103-108, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:10:y:1971:i:1:p:103-108
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01718626
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tullock, Gordon, 1970. "A Simple Algebraic Logrolling Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 419-426, June.
    2. De Alessi, Louis, 1969. "Implications of Property Rights for Government Investment Choices," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 13-24, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Taner Güney, 2015. "Environmental sustainability and pressure groups," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 49(6), pages 2331-2344, November.
    2. Germana Bottone, 2009. "Education in Italy: is there any return?," ISAE Working Papers 109, ISTAT - Italian National Institute of Statistics - (Rome, ITALY).

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