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Logrolling Procedure for Multi-Issue Negotiation

Author

Listed:
  • May Tajima

    (University of Waterloo)

  • Niall M. Fraser

    (University of Waterloo)

Abstract

In order to better deal with the complexity in multi-issue negotiation, a quantitative method which produces Pareto optimal solutions through jointly improving exchange of issues is proposed. The trade-off process is modelled using logrolling, in which loss in some issues is traded for gain in others, resulting in overall gain for all parties. This mutual gain approach is designed based on the integrative negotiation strategy. The objective of the logrolling method is in negotiation support by providing a structure and systematic analysis for ill-defined multi-issue negotiation problems. This study presents a formal representation of logrolling, the sequential logrolling procedure that is based on the exchange of two issues, and the general properties of the efficient frontier produced by logrolling under a linear preference assumption. The study also includes some discussion on implementation aspects of the logrolling method.

Suggested Citation

  • May Tajima & Niall M. Fraser, 2001. "Logrolling Procedure for Multi-Issue Negotiation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 217-235, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:10:y:2001:i:3:d:10.1023_a:1011262625052
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1011262625052
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
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    3. Teich, Jeffrey E. & Wallenius, Hannele & Wallenius, Jyrki & Zionts, Stanley, 1996. "Identifying Pareto-optimal settlements for two-party resource allocation negotiations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 93(3), pages 536-549, September.
    4. Tullock, Gordon, 1970. "A Simple Algebraic Logrolling Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 419-426, June.
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    6. Wilson, Robert, 1969. "An Axiomatic Model of Logrolling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(3), pages 331-341, June.
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    8. Sunil Gupta, 1989. "Modeling Integrative, Multiple Issue Bargaining," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 35(7), pages 788-806, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rudolf Vetschera & Michael Filzmoser & Ronald Mitterhofer, 2014. "An Analytical Approach to Offer Generation in Concession-Based Negotiation Processes," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 71-99, January.
    2. Henner Gimpel, 2007. "Loss Aversion and Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Attribute Negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 303-319, July.
    3. Stephen E. Weiss, 2012. "Negotiators’ Effectiveness with Mixed Agendas: An Empirical Exploration of Tasks, Decisions and Performance Criteria," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 255-290, May.
    4. Michael Filzmoser & Rudolf Vetschera, 2008. "A Classification of Bargaining Steps and their Impact on Negotiation Outcomes," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 421-443, September.
    5. Nelson Borges Amaral & Jinfeng Jiao, 2023. "Responses to Ethical Scenarios: The Impact of Trade-Off Salience on Competing Construal Level Effects," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 745-762, March.

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