Preferences and Democracy
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Citations
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Cited by:
- SALMON, Pierre, 1995.
"Democratic governments, economic growth and income distribution,"
LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003)
1995-11, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
- Pierre Salmon, 1997. "Democratic governments, economic growth, and income distribution," Post-Print hal-00445594, HAL.
- Pierre Salmon, 1995. "Democratic governments, economic growth and income distribution," Working Papers hal-01545751, HAL.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999.
"The size and scope of government:: Comparative politics with rational politicians,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 699-735, April.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "The size and the scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians," Working Papers 137, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics With Rational Politicians," CEPR Discussion Papers 2051, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1998. "The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians," Seminar Papers 658, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1998. "The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians," Papers 658, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1998. "The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians," NBER Working Papers 6848, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Pierre Salmon, 1993.
"Transfert de compétences et réallocation du capital social à la disposition des collectivités territoriales,"
Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 44(4), pages 821-834.
- SALMON, Pierre, 1993. "Transfert de compétences et réallocation du capital social à la disposition des collectivités territoriales," LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) 1993-01, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
- Kirchgassner, Gebhard, 2000.
"Probabilistic Voting and Equilibrium: An Impossibility Result,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1-2), pages 35-48, April.
- Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2000. "Probabilistic Voting and Equilibrium: An Impossibility Result," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 35-48, April.
- Michele Polo, "undated". "Electoral competition and political rents," Working Papers 144, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Aidt, T. & Jensen, P.S., 2007. "The Taxman Tools Up: An Event History Study of the Introduction of the Personal Income Tax in Western Europe, 1815-1941," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0766, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Howitt, Peter & Wintrobe, Ronald, 1995. "The political economy of inaction," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 329-353, March.
- Aidt, T.S. & Dutta, J., 2008. "Electoral Uncertainty and Public Goods," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0843, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Aidt, Toke S. & Jensen, Peter S., 2009. "The taxman tools up: An event history study of the introduction of the personal income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 160-175, February.
- Pierre Salmon, 2001.
"Constitutional Implications of Electoral Assumptions,"
Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 333-349, December.
- Pierre Salmon, 2001. "Constitutional Implications of electoral assumptions," Post-Print hal-00445605, HAL.
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