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The Advantages of Pure Forms of Parliamentary Democracy over Mixed Forms

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  • Charles Blankart
  • Dennis Mueller

Abstract

It is often said that parliament shouldrepresent the opinions found in thepopulation and that government should beheld accountable for its political program.It is shown that these two goals rely ontwo different basic models of democracywhich are not fully compatible with eachother: the model of a pure representativedemocracy and the model of a pure two partycompetition. Unaccountable governments,voter alienation, strategic voting, andgovernmental instability are shown to beconsequences of this institutional mix.These problems may be avoided with reformsin the direction of one or the other basicmodel. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Blankart & Dennis Mueller, 2004. "The Advantages of Pure Forms of Parliamentary Democracy over Mixed Forms," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 431-453, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:121:y:2004:i:3:p:431-453
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-004-2682-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
    2. Kirchgassner, Gebhard, 2000. "Probabilistic Voting and Equilibrium: An Impossibility Result," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1-2), pages 35-48, April.
    3. Hammond, Thomas H. & Miller, Gary J., 1987. "The Core of the Constitution," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1155-1174, December.
    4. Dennis Mueller, 1999. "Fundamental Issues in Constitutional Reform: With Special Reference to Latin America and the United States," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 119-148, June.
    5. Coughlin, Peter J & Mueller, Dennis C & Murrell, Peter, 1990. "Electoral Politics, Interest Groups, and the Size of Government," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(4), pages 682-705, October.
    6. James M. Buchanan, 1954. "Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(2), pages 114-114.
    7. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, September.
    8. Brennan, Geoffrey & Hamlin, Alan, 1992. "Bicameralism and Majoritarian Equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 169-179, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hans Gersbach, 2017. "Co-voting democracy," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 337-349, November.
    2. Charles B. Blankart, 2013. "Public Choice: A Survey," CESifo Working Paper Series 4102, CESifo.
    3. Drosdowski, Thomas, 2006. "On the Link Between Democracy and Environment," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-355, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    4. Charles B. Blankart, 2016. "Public Choice and Public Finance: A Survey," CESifo Working Paper Series 5819, CESifo.
    5. Charles B. Blankart & Dennis C. Mueller, 2014. "Wer soll die Bürger im Staat repräsentieren?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 67(15), pages 31-34, August.
    6. Charles B. Blankart & Gerrit B. Koester, 2007. "The Economic Analysis of Constitutions: Fatalism Versus Vitalism," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 4(2), pages 169-183, May.
    7. Randall Holcombe & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2010. "Policy errors in executive and legislative decision-making," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 37-51, July.

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