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Pareto Optimality in Electoral Competition

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  • Ordeshook, Peter C.

Abstract

The core of welfare economics consists of the proof that, for certain classes of goods, perfectly competitive markets are efficient in that they provide Pareto optimal allocations of these goods. In this paper, the efficiency of competitive elections is examined. Elections are modeled as two-candidate zero-sum games, and three kinds of equilibria for such games are identified: pure, risky, and mixed strategies. It is shown, however, that regardless of which kind of equilibrium prevails, if candidates adopt equilibrium strategies, an election is efficient in the sense that the candidates advocate Pareto optimal policies. But one caveat to this analysis is that while an election is Pareto optimal, citizens can unanimously prefer markets to elections as a mechanism for selecting future policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Ordeshook, Peter C., 1971. "Pareto Optimality in Electoral Competition," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(4), pages 1141-1145, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:65:y:1971:i:04:p:1141-1145_13
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    Cited by:

    1. John Goodman & Philip Porter, 1985. "Majority voting and Pareto optimality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 173-186, January.
    2. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2000. "Probabilistic Voting and Equilibrium: An Impossibility Result," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 35-48, April.
    3. Melvin Hinich & Peter Ordeshook, 1971. "Social welfare and electoral competition in democratic societies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 73-87, September.
    4. Peter Coughlin, 1982. "Pareto optimality of policy proposals with probabilistic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 427-433, January.
    5. Gerald H. Kramer, 1975. "A Dynamical Model of Political Equilibrium," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 396, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

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