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The Organizational Architecture of Nonprofit Governance: Economic Calculation Within an Ecology of Enterprises

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  • Monica Auteri
  • Richard Wagner

Abstract

This paper treats nonprofit firms as elements within the ecology of enterprises that constitute an economy. Within this ecological framework, nonprofit governance must to a significant extent be guided by economic signals generated through market competition. After we examine the problems of economic calculation that nonprofit enterprises face, we consider the organizational logic of nonprofit firms as one that is driven by the creation of points of contact with the market economy. The operation of this logic creates some general limit on the range and size of nonprofit firms, and also presents issues of governance that differ from those faced by profit-seeking firms. Subsequently, we use our conceptual framework to illuminate some issues concerning the organization of nonprofit firms. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

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  • Monica Auteri & Richard Wagner, 2007. "The Organizational Architecture of Nonprofit Governance: Economic Calculation Within an Ecology of Enterprises," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 57-68, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:porgrv:v:7:y:2007:i:1:p:57-68
    DOI: 10.1007/s11115-006-0027-7
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    Cited by:

    1. Richard Wagner, 2011. "Municipal corporations, economic calculation, and political pricing: exploring a theoretical antinomy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(1), pages 151-165, October.
    2. Richard E. Wagner, 2012. "Deficits, Debt, and Democracy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14477.
    3. Adam Martin & Matias Petersen, 2019. "Poverty Alleviation as an Economic Problem," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 43(1), pages 205-221.
    4. Paul Dragos Aligica & Richard E. Wagner, 2020. "Economic coordination in environments with incomplete pricing," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 33(3), pages 315-329, September.
    5. Sven-Olof Collin & Elin Smith, 2008. "Democracy and Private Property: Governance of a Three-Party Public–Private Partnership," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 53-68, March.
    6. Richard Wagner, 2013. "What kind of state in our future? Fact and Conjecture in Vito Tanzi’s Government versus Markets," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 26(1), pages 93-104, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    agency; economic calculation; entrepreneurship; governance; nonprofit firms; D23; G32; J31; L31; M13;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
    • M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups

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