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Explaining why public officials perceive interest groups as influential: on the role of policy capacities and policy insiderness

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  • Adrià Albareda

    (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

  • Caelesta Braun

    (Leiden University)

  • Bert Fraussen

    (Leiden University)

Abstract

This article asks why public officials perceive some interest groups as influential for policy outcomes. Theoretically, we rely on resource exchange and behavioral approaches. Perceived influence of interest groups does not only follow from the policy capacities they bring to the table; it also relates to the extent to which public officials consider groups as policy insiders. Both effects are assumed to be conditional on advocacy salience, i.e., the number of stakeholders mobilized in each legislative proposal. We rely on a new dataset of 103 prominent interest groups involved in 28 legislative proposals passed between 2015 and 2016 at the European Union level. Our findings show that interest groups associated with high analytical and political capacities are perceived as more influential for final policy outcomes than other groups with less policy capacities. Yet, in policy issues with high advocacy salience, interest groups characterized by higher ‘insiderness’ are perceived as more influential among public officials.

Suggested Citation

  • Adrià Albareda & Caelesta Braun & Bert Fraussen, 2023. "Explaining why public officials perceive interest groups as influential: on the role of policy capacities and policy insiderness," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 56(2), pages 191-209, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:policy:v:56:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s11077-023-09491-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s11077-023-09491-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Albareda, Adrià & Fraussen, Bert, 2023. "The representative capacity of interest groups: explaining how issue features shape membership involvement when establishing policy positions," OSF Preprints dj54y, Center for Open Science.

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