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The Revolving Door and Access to the European Commission: Does the Logic of Influence Prevail?

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  • Sharon S. Belli
  • Jan Beyers

Abstract

This article analyses to what extent and under which conditions revolving door practices relate to access to the European Commission (EC). The revolving door hypothesis is analysed by combining two data sources: a dataset with publicly available records about the meetings between interest organizations and senior EC officials and evidence collected through the Comparative Interest Group‐survey (CIG‐survey). It is especially in professionalized organizations, where staff and organizational leadership dominate, that we observe a significant positive relationship between revolving door practices and access. In contrast, the extent to which the membership decides on political positioning and advocacy strategies has no impact on the relationship between revolving door and access. These results show that the revolving door is primarily connected with a logic of influence, implying that revolvers are especially advantageous for professionalized organizations.

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  • Sharon S. Belli & Jan Beyers, 2024. "The Revolving Door and Access to the European Commission: Does the Logic of Influence Prevail?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(1), pages 186-204, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:62:y:2024:i:1:p:186-204
    DOI: 10.1111/jcms.13486
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