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The political economy of campaign contributions in insurance markets

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  • Patricia Born
  • James Bradley Karl
  • Lawrence Powell

Abstract

Contributions to election campaigns are tracked by the National Institute on Money in State Politics. In this paper, we use this data to examine patterns in political campaign contributions made by the insurance industry. We compile a state‐level data set that aggregates over 67,000 election campaign contributions to insurance regulators and governors; we show that candidate incumbency status is associated with a 20% to 30% increase in the share of contributions made to the incumbent insurance regulator's political party. Because incumbents are overwhelmingly favored to win elections, the industry's behavior suggests that insurers are more concerned with access to the elected official than with supporting a candidate that shares the industry's goals.

Suggested Citation

  • Patricia Born & James Bradley Karl & Lawrence Powell, 2024. "The political economy of campaign contributions in insurance markets," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 27(1), pages 41-55, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:rmgtin:v:27:y:2024:i:1:p:41-55
    DOI: 10.1111/rmir.12263
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    References listed on IDEAS

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