IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/jmgtgv/v2y1998i4p357-379.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

National Networks of Corporate Power: An Irish Perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Leo Mac Canna
  • Niamh Brennan
  • Eleanor O'Higgins

Abstract

This paper maps the network of interlocking directorships formed by the boards of the top 50 financial and 200 non-financial companies in Ireland. The Irish network is compared with those in ten countries, based on the same sample size and selection criteria as used in this paper, using the methods and theory of Social Network Analysis (SNA). Fundamental to the paper is the idea that the network of interlocking directorates is in some way structured, and not the result of random processes. Irish boards were found to have a relatively loosely connected network structure which is sparser and less dense than those of other countries. This is reflected in the relatively low percentage of multiple directors and the relatively fewer number of directorships per multiple director. In general, indigenous Irish public companies tended to be central in the network, while a disproportionately large number of foreign and private companies were isolated on the periphery. However, a number of foreign-owned companies were central to the network -- in particular, those which started as indigenous Irish companies which were subsequently taken over. When account is taken of the nature of the Irish economy and business, in comparison with that of the ten other countries, it is seen that the opportunities for company interlinking at board level in Ireland are relatively fewer. However, within these constraints, there is a thriving network of corporate power in Ireland. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Suggested Citation

  • Leo Mac Canna & Niamh Brennan & Eleanor O'Higgins, 1998. "National Networks of Corporate Power: An Irish Perspective," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 2(4), pages 357-379, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:2:y:1998:i:4:p:357-379
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1009972108819
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1009972108819
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1023/A:1009972108819?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hallock, Kevin F., 1997. "Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive Compensation," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(3), pages 331-344, September.
    2. Julie A. Caswell, 1984. "An Institutional Perspective on Corporate Control and the Network of Interlocking Directorates," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(2), pages 619-626, June.
    3. Coulson-Thomas, Colin, 1990. "Developing directors," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 488-499, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Niamh Brennan & Michael McDermott, 2004. "Alternative Perspectives on Independence of Directors," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 325-336, July.
    2. Pawlak Marek, 2010. "An interlocking-directorates monitoring system," Journal for Perspectives of Economic Political and Social Integration, Sciendo, vol. 16(1-2), pages 121-154, January.
    3. Juan Antonio Rubio Mondéjar & Josean Garrués Irurzun, 2012. "Estructura corporativa e interlocking directorates en las mayores empresas españolas, 1917-1970," FEG Working Paper Series 01/12, Faculty of Economics and Business (University of Granada).
    4. Drago, Carlo & Amidani Aliberti, Livia & Carbonai, Davide, 2014. "Measuring Gender Differences in Information Sharing Using Network Analysis: the Case of the Austrian Interlocking Directorship Network in 2009," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 178241, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    5. Farina, Vincenzo, 2008. "Banks’ centrality in corporate interlock networks: evidences in Italy," MPRA Paper 11698, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Niamh Brennan, 2010. "A review of corporate governance research : an Irish perspective," Open Access publications 10197/2962, Research Repository, University College Dublin.
    7. Marek Pawlak, 2008. "Interlocking Directorships in Polish Joint Stock Companies," Management, University of Primorska, Faculty of Management Koper, vol. 3(3), pages 205-220.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ishii, Joy & Xuan, Yuhai, 2014. "Acquirer-target social ties and merger outcomes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(3), pages 344-363.
    2. Abdelrhman Yusuf & Mohamed Sherif, 2020. "All on Board? New Evidence on Board Characteristics from a Large Panel of UK FTSE Indices," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(13), pages 1-26, July.
    3. Goergen, Marc & Manjon, Miguel C. & Renneboog, Luc, 2008. "Recent developments in German corporate governance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 175-193, September.
    4. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 1999. "Bankers on Boards: Monitoring, Conflicts of Interest, and Lender Liability," NBER Working Papers 7319, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Donaldson, Jason & Piacentino, Giorgia & Malenko, Nadya, 2017. "Deadlock on the Board," CEPR Discussion Papers 12503, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Apr), pages 7-26.
    7. Randy Beavers & Shawn Mobbs, 2020. "Director overconfidence," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 49(2), pages 389-422, June.
    8. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 71-92, Summer.
    9. Renee B. Adams & Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2010. "The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 58-107, March.
    10. Lauren Cohen & Andrea Frazzini & Christopher Malloy, 2008. "The Small World of Investing: Board Connections and Mutual Fund Returns," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(5), pages 951-979, October.
    11. Chuluun, Tuugi, 2015. "The role of underwriter peer networks in IPOs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 62-78.
    12. Fich, Eliezer M. & White, Lawrence J., 2005. "Why do CEOs reciprocally sit on each other's boards?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-2), pages 175-195, March.
    13. Vidhi Chhaochharia & Yaniv Grinstein, 2007. "The Changing Structure of US Corporate Boards: 1997–2003," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(6), pages 1215-1223, November.
    14. Stephan Weemaes & Johan Bruneel & Ann Gaeremynck & Jonas Debrulle, 2022. "Initial external knowledge sources and start-up growth," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 523-540, January.
    15. Dyballa, Katharina & Kraft, Kornelius, 2015. "Does codetermination affect the composition of variable versus fixed parts of executive compensation?," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-053, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    16. Galina Zudenkova, 2015. "Political cronyism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(3), pages 473-492, March.
    17. Banele Dlamini & Julius Tapera & Shynet Chivasa, 2017. "Can Sound Corporate Governance Alleviate Corporate Failure? A Study of the Zimbabwean Financial Services Sector," Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies, AMH International, vol. 9(2), pages 88-95.
    18. Kroszner, Randall S. & Strahan, Philip E., 1999. "Bankers on Boards: Monitoring Conflicts of Interest & Lender Liability," Working Papers 150, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    19. Noel O'Sullivan, 2005. "Why do executives serve as non-executives? Pre-Cadbury evidence from UK non-financial companies," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(2), pages 161-176.
    20. Carlos Drago & Francesco Millo & Roberto Ricciuti & Paolo Santella, 2011. "Corporate Governance Reforms, Interlocking Directorship Networks and Company Value in Italy (1998-2007)," CESifo Working Paper Series 3322, CESifo.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:2:y:1998:i:4:p:357-379. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.