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Interlocking Directorships in Polish Joint Stock Companies

Author

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  • Marek Pawlak

    (The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland)

Abstract

Studies concerning interlocking directorships have been carried out among Polish joint stock corporations. The main source of data have been the announcements that are to be published by corporations regularly in a journal called Business and Court Gazette (BCG). Interlocking directorships constitute a network among corporations the use of which enables co-ordinated management of the whole group. The phenomenon of interlocking directorships in Polish joint stock companies can be compared to the same phenomenon existing in other countries. About 13.43 percent of Polish joint stock company directors possess additional directorships. The average number of directorships for the whole group employed by Polish joint stock companies is 1,207, and 2,541 for people who hold more than one mandate. There is a positive correlation between the total investments in the Polish economy and the number of multiple directorships.

Suggested Citation

  • Marek Pawlak, 2008. "Interlocking Directorships in Polish Joint Stock Companies," Management, University of Primorska, Faculty of Management Koper, vol. 3(3), pages 205-220.
    • Handle: RePEc:mgt:youmng:v:3:y:2008:i:3:p:205-220
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Justyna Swiatowiec-Szczepanska & Michal Zdziarski, 2016. "Application of ONA in Change Management – Empirical Research in Energy Industry (Zastosowanie analizy sieci organizacyjnych w zarzadzaniu zmiana – badanie empiryczne w branzy energetycznej )," Problemy Zarzadzania, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, vol. 14(64), pages 157-176.

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