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How Economic Incentives May Destroy Social, Ecological and Existential Values: The Case of Executive Compensation

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  • Knut Ims
  • Lars Pedersen
  • Laszlo Zsolnai

Abstract

Executive compensation has long been a prominent topic in the management literature. A main question that is also given substantial attention in the business ethics literature—even more so in the wake of the recent financial crisis—is whether increasing levels of executive compensation can be justified from an ethical point of view. Also, the relationship of executive compensation to instances of unethical behavior or outcomes has received considerable attention. The purpose of this paper is to explore the social, ecological, and existential costs of economic incentives, by discussing how relying on increasing levels of executive compensation may have an adverse effect on managerial performance in a broad sense. Specifically, we argue that one-dimensional economic incentives may destroy existential, social, and systemic values that influence the manager’s commitment to ensure responsible business conduct, and have negative spillover effects that may reduce the manager’s performance. There are well-documented findings that demonstrate that reliance on sources of extrinsic motivation (such as economic incentives) may displace intrinsic motivation. Our perspective is a holistic one, in the sense that we will explore the influence of sources of extrinsic motivation on the manager’s intrinsic commitment to different types of values. We will in particular investigate how it may influence the manager’s ethical reflection and behavior or lack thereof. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Knut Ims & Lars Pedersen & Laszlo Zsolnai, 2014. "How Economic Incentives May Destroy Social, Ecological and Existential Values: The Case of Executive Compensation," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 123(2), pages 353-360, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:123:y:2014:i:2:p:353-360
    DOI: 10.1007/s10551-013-1844-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Confidence Amadi & Felicia Amadi, 2017. "Is There An Industry Effect in Executive Compensation? Evidence from Aerospace/Defense and Leisure/Hospitality Industry," International Journal of Business and Management, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 12(8), pages 1-51, July.
    3. Yanrong Jia & Ananth Seetharaman & Yan Sun & Xu Wang, 2023. "Relative Performance Goals and Management Earnings Guidance," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 183(4), pages 1045-1071, April.
    4. Claude Francoeur & Andrea Melis & Silvia Gaia & Simone Aresu, 2017. "Green or Greed? An Alternative Look at CEO Compensation and Corporate Environmental Commitment," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 439-453, February.
    5. Luigino Bruni & Vittorio Pelligra & Tommaso Reggiani & Matteo Rizzolli, 2020. "The Pied Piper: Prizes, Incentives, and Motivation Crowding-in," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 166(3), pages 643-658, October.
    6. Clementino, Ester & Perkins, Richard, 2020. "How do companies respond to environmental, social and governance (ESG) ratings? Evidence from Italy," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 103046, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Isaline Thirion & Patrick Reichert & Virginie Xhauflair & Jonathan Jonck, 2022. "From Fiduciary Duty to Impact Fidelity: Managerial Compensation in Impact Investing," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 179(4), pages 991-1010, September.
    8. Fernando Gómez-Bezares & Wojciech Przychodzen & Justyna Przychodzen, 2019. "Corporate Sustainability and CEO–Employee Pay Gap—Buster or Booster?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(21), pages 1-15, October.
    9. Shandana Shoaib & Yehuda Baruch, 2019. "Deviant Behavior in a Moderated-Mediation Framework of Incentives, Organizational Justice Perception, and Reward Expectancy," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 157(3), pages 617-633, July.
    10. Michael S. Aßländer & Julia Roloff & Dilek Zamantili Nayır, 2016. "Suppliers as Stewards? Managing Social Standards in First- and Second-Tier Suppliers," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 139(4), pages 661-683, December.
    11. Ester Clementino & Richard Perkins, 2021. "How Do Companies Respond to Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) ratings? Evidence from Italy," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 171(2), pages 379-397, June.

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