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Market power and contract form: evidence from physician group practices

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  • Robert Town
  • Roger Feldman
  • John Kralewski

Abstract

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  • Robert Town & Roger Feldman & John Kralewski, 2011. "Market power and contract form: evidence from physician group practices," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 115-132, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ijhcfe:v:11:y:2011:i:2:p:115-132
    DOI: 10.1007/s10754-011-9091-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Jack Hadley & James Reschovsky, 2006. "Medicare fees and physicians’ medicare service volume: Beneficiaries treated and services per beneficiary," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 131-150, June.
    3. Town, Robert & Vistnes, Gregory, 2001. "Hospital competition in HMO networks," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 733-753, September.
    4. Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini, 2002. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 564-591, June.
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    6. Allen, Douglas W & Lueck, Dean, 1995. "Risk Preferences and the Economics of Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 447-451, May.
    7. repec:mpr:mprres:3551 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. McGuire, Thomas G., 2000. "Physician agency," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 461-536, Elsevier.
    9. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    10. Robert G. Evans, 1974. "Supplier-Induced Demand: Some Empirical Evidence and Implications," International Economic Association Series, in: Mark Perlman (ed.), The Economics of Health and Medical Care, chapter 10, pages 162-173, Palgrave Macmillan.
    11. Gowrisankaran, Gautam & Town, Robert J., 1999. "Estimating the quality of care in hospitals using instrumental variables," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 747-767, December.
    12. Jack High (ed.), 2001. "Competition," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1751.
    13. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1990. "Optimal payment systems for health services," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 375-396, December.
    14. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1986. "Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement : Cost sharing and supply," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 129-151, June.
    15. Sandra Decker, 2007. "Medicaid physician fees and the quality of medical care of Medicaid patients in the USA," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 95-112, March.
    16. Christopher Brunt & Gail Jensen, 2010. "Medicare Part B reimbursement and the perceived quality of physician care," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 149-170, June.
    17. Ma, Ching-to Albert & McGuire, Thomas G, 1997. "Optimal Health Insurance and Provider Payment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 685-704, September.
    18. A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), 2000. "Handbook of Health Economics," Handbook of Health Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    19. Selden, Thomas M., 1990. "A model of capitation," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 397-409, December.
    20. Seldon, Barry J. & Jung, Chulho & Cavazos, Roberto J., 1998. "Market power among physicians in the U.S., 1983-1991," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 799-824.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Gaynor & Kate Ho & Robert J. Town, 2015. "The Industrial Organization of Health-Care Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 53(2), pages 235-284, June.
    2. Laurence Baker & M. Kate Bundorf & Aileen Devlin & Daniel P. Kessler, 2016. "Why Don’t Commercial Health Plans Use Prospective Payment?," NBER Working Papers 22709, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Zack Cooper & Stuart V Craig & Martin Gaynor & John Van Reenen, 2019. "The Price Ain’t Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 134(1), pages 51-107.
    4. Dominic Coey, 2013. "Physician Incentives and Treatment Choices in Heart Attack Management," Discussion Papers 12-027, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    5. Laurence Baker & M. Kate Bundorf & Aileen Devlin & Daniel P. Kessler, 2019. "Why Don't Commercial Health Plans Use Prospective Payment?," American Journal of Health Economics, MIT Press, vol. 5(4), pages 465-480, Fall.
    6. Gaynor, Martin & Town, Robert J., 2011. "Competition in Health Care Markets," Handbook of Health Economics, in: Mark V. Pauly & Thomas G. Mcguire & Pedro P. Barros (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 499-637, Elsevier.
    7. Brunt, Christopher S. & Bowblis, John R., 2014. "Health insurer market power and primary care consolidation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 61-65.
    8. Nosal, K.;, 2017. "Two-Sided Matching in Physician-Insurer Networks: Evidence from Medicare Advantage," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 17/19, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
    9. Nosal, K., 2016. "Physician Group Practices and Technology Diffusion: Evidence from New Antidiabetic Drugs," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 16/22, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
    10. H. Frech & Christopher Whaley & Benjamin Handel & Liora Bowers & Carol Simon & Richard Scheffler, 2015. "Market Power, Transactions Costs, and the Entry of Accountable Care Organizations in Health Care," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 47(2), pages 167-193, September.
    11. Toren L. Fronsdal & Jay Bhattacharya & Suzanne Tamang, 2020. "Variation in Health Care Prices Across Public and Private Payers," NBER Working Papers 27490, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Physicians; Contracts; Market power; I11; L13; L14;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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