Risk sharing and the supply of mental health services
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Nolan, Anne, 2019. "Reforming the delivery of public dental services in Ireland: potential cost implications," Research Series, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), number RS80.
- Rudy Douven & Minke Remmerswaal & Ilaria Mosca, 2014. "Unintended effects of reimbursement schedules in mental health care," CPB Discussion Paper 292, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Douven, Rudy & Remmerswaal, Minke & Mosca, Ilaria, 2015. "Unintended effects of reimbursement schedules in mental health care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 139-150.
- Rudy Douven & Minke Remmerswaal & Ilaria Mosca, 2014. "Unintended effects of reimbursement schedules in mental health care," CPB Discussion Paper 292.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
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