Why Don't Commercial Health Plans Use Prospective Payment?
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- Joseph P. Newhouse, 1996. "Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production versus Selection," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(3), pages 1236-1263, September.
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More about this item
Keywords
Medicare; DRG; hospital payment; health insurance; moral hazard;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
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