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Dynamite Regulations. The Explosives Industry, Regulatory Capture and the Swedish Government 1858-1948

Author

Listed:
  • Josefin Sabo

    (Umeå University)

  • Lena Andersson-Skog

    (Umeå University)

Abstract

In this article, we argue that the regulation of the explosives industry in Sweden between 1858 and 1948 can give a slightly different perspective on regulatory capture. In this case it was the upstart company, the Nobel Dynamite Company, and not the established explosives companies that in negotiation with the regulator succeeded in establishing new national regulations. Through three different cases we show that the method behind this successful capture was indirect and direct with a common trait of risk minimizing for the public that developed in cooperation with the regulator.

Suggested Citation

  • Josefin Sabo & Lena Andersson-Skog, 2017. "Dynamite Regulations. The Explosives Industry, Regulatory Capture and the Swedish Government 1858-1948," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 23(2), pages 191-201, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:iaecre:v:23:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11294-017-9637-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s11294-017-9637-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. International Monetary Fund, 2006. "Regulatory Capture in Banking," IMF Working Papers 2006/034, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    4. Russell Smyth & Magnus Söderberg, 2010. "Public interest versus regulatory capture in the Swedish electricity market," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 292-312, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Yu Tu & Benhong Peng & Ehsan Elahi & Weiku Wu, 2020. "Initiator or Intermediary? A Case Study on Network Relation of Environmental Regulatory Capture in China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(24), pages 1-19, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sweden; Dynamite; Regulatory capture; Industrialization; Government-market relations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N10 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General

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