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Reactions to (the absence of) control and workplace arrangements: experimental evidence from the internet and the laboratory

Author

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  • Katrin Schmelz

    (University of Konstanz
    Thurgau Institute of Economics)

  • Anthony Ziegelmeyer

    (Queen’s Management School, Queen’s University Belfast)

Abstract

This paper reports an experiment designed to assess the influence of workplace arrangements on the reactions to (the absence of) control. We compare behavior in an Internet and a laboratory principal-agent game where the principal can control the agent by implementing a minimum effort requirement. Then the agent chooses an effort costly to her but beneficial to the principal. Our design captures meaningful differences between working from home and working at the office arrangements. Online subjects enjoy greater anonymity than lab subjects, they interact in a less constrained environment than the laboratory, and there is a larger physically-oriented social distance between them. Control is significantly more effective online than in the laboratory. Positive reactions to the principal’s choice not to control are observed in both treatments, but they are significantly weaker online than in the laboratory. Principals often choose the highest control level, which maximizes their earnings.

Suggested Citation

  • Katrin Schmelz & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2020. "Reactions to (the absence of) control and workplace arrangements: experimental evidence from the internet and the laboratory," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(4), pages 933-960, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:23:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s10683-020-09666-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-020-09666-8
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    Cited by:

    1. Nobuyuki Hanaki & Takayuki Hoshino & Kohei Kubota & Fabrice Murtin & Masao Ogaki & Fumio Ohtake & Naoko Okuyama, 2022. "Comparing data gathered in an online and a laboratory experiment using the Trustlab platform," ISER Discussion Paper 1168, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    2. Holger Herz & Christian Zihlmann, 2021. "Adverse Effects of Contol: Evidence from a Field Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 8890, CESifo.
    3. Katrin Schmelz & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2020. "State Coercion and Control Aversion: Evidence from an Internet Study in East and West Germany," TWI Research Paper Series 117, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
    4. De Chiara, Alessandro & Engl, Florian & Herz, Holger & Manna, Ester, 2022. "Control Aversion in Hierarchies," FSES Working Papers 527, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland.
    5. Russo, Giovanni & Van Houten, Gijs, 2021. "Complex Job Design and Layers of Hierarchy," IZA Discussion Papers 14455, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Simon Gächter & Esther Kaiser & Manfred Königstein, 2024. "Incentive contracts crowd out voluntary cooperation: Evidence from gift-exchange experiments," Discussion Papers 2024-02, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    7. Schmelz, Katrin & Ziegelmeyer, Anthony, 2019. "State coercion and control aversion: An internet study in East and West Germany," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203622, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Pin, Paolo & Rotesi, Tiziano, 2023. "App-based experiments," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    9. Holger Herz & Christian Zihlmann, 2024. "Adverse effects of control? Evidence from a field experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(2), pages 469-488, April.
    10. Nobuyuki Hanaki & Takahiro Hoshino & Kohei Kubota & Fabrice Murtin & Masao Ogaki & Fumio Ohtake & Naoko Okuyama, 2022. "Comparing data gathered in an online and a laboratory experiment using the Trustlab platform," ISER Discussion Paper 1168r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jun 2022.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Hidden benefits of abstaining from control; Laboratory; Internet; Workplace arrangements;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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