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Adverse Effects of Contol: Evidence from a Field Experiment

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  • Holger Herz
  • Christian Zihlmann

Abstract

We conduct a field experiment with remote workers to causally assess the impact of introducing a control mechanism on performance, and analyse the incidence of potential effects across tasks of different difficulty. We find that the implementation of control significantly reduces performance. The reduction occurs primarily among challenging tasks, whereas performance among simple tasks is unaffected. Further, the effects are primarily driven by workers with non-pecuniary motivation when uncontrolled. Our findings suggest that the relative importance of high performance among challenging tasks for employer profits can be a crucial determinant of the overall profitability of control interventions.

Suggested Citation

  • Holger Herz & Christian Zihlmann, 2021. "Adverse Effects of Contol: Evidence from a Field Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 8890, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8890
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    Cited by:

    1. Burdin, Gabriel & Dughera, Stefano & Landini, Fabio & Belloc, Filippo, 2023. "Contested Transparency: Digital Monitoring Technologies and Worker Voice," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1340, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    2. Alessandro De Chiara & Florian Engl & Holger Herz & Ester Manna, 2022. "Control Aversion in Hierarchies," CESifo Working Paper Series 9779, CESifo.
    3. Herz, Holger & Kistler, Deborah & Zehnder, Christian & Zihlmann, Christian, 2022. "Hindsight Bias and Trust in Government: Evidence from the United States," FSES Working Papers 526, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    control; hidden costs of control; remote work; field experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - General

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