IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/enreec/v20y2001i4p259-279.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Incentive Contracts and Environmental Performance Indicators

Author

Listed:
  • Peter Goldsmith
  • Rishi Basak

Abstract

A principal-agent (P-A) model is used to analyse the effect of environmentaldiligence, the principal (top management), having to use imperfectperformance indicators and fearing penalties for environmental damages,wants to avoid environmental harm and induce the agent (employeemanipulating hazardous materials) to take appropriate action. To motivatethe agent, the principal offers an incentive contract based onenvironmental stewardship performance (as measured by EPI).Environmental stewardship being difficult to measure, due to high levelsof uncertainty surrounding, EPI, creates impediments to the establishmentof an efficient P-A contract. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Goldsmith & Rishi Basak, 2001. "Incentive Contracts and Environmental Performance Indicators," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 20(4), pages 259-279, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:20:y:2001:i:4:p:259-279
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1013065801547
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1013065801547
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1023/A:1013065801547?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hueth, Brent & Ligon, Ethan, 1998. "Quality Measurement And Risk-Sharing In Contracts For California Fruits And Vegetables," 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT 20957, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    2. Sinclair-Desgagne, Bernard & Gabel, H. Landis, 1997. "Environmental Auditing in Management Systems and Public Policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 331-346, July.
    3. Arnott, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1991. "Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 179-190, March.
    4. Gabel H. Landis & Sinclair-Desgagne Bernard, 1993. "Managerial Incentives and Environmental Compliance," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 229-240, May.
    5. Jewitt, Ian, 1988. "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1177-1190, September.
    6. Bystrom, Olof & Bromley, Daniel W., 1998. "Contracting For Nonpoint-Source Pollution Abatement," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 23(1), pages 1-19, July.
    7. Segerson, Kathleen & Tietenberg, Tom, 1992. "The structure of penalties in environmental enforcement: An economic analysis," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 179-200, September.
    8. Peter Goldsmith & Rishi Basak, 1999. "Environmental Management Systems and Executive-Employee Risk Sharing," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 47(4), pages 474-474, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Goldsmith, Peter D. & Turan, Nesve A. & Gow, Hamish R., 2004. "Firms, Incentives, And The Supply Of Food Safety: A Formal Model Of Government Enforcement," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20343, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    2. Paolo Perego & Frank Hartmann, 2009. "Aligning Performance Measurement Systems With Strategy: The Case of Environmental Strategy," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 45(4), pages 397-428, December.
    3. Aline Grahn, 2020. "Precision and Manipulation of Non‐financial Information: The Curious Case of Environmental Liability," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 56(4), pages 495-534, December.
    4. Goldsmith, Peter D. & Turan, Nesve A. & Gow, Hamish R., 2003. "Food Safety In The Meat Industry: A Regulatory Quagmire," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 6(1), pages 1-13.
    5. Philippe Bontems & Gilles Rotillon & Nadine Turpin, 2004. "Improvement of water quality as a joint production of milk when dairy farms are heterogeneous [Incitation à la production jointe d'eau de qualité et de lait lorsque les exploitations laitières sont," Post-Print hal-01606126, HAL.
    6. Poyago-Theotoky Joanna & Yong Soo Keong, 2019. "Managerial Delegation Contracts, “Green” R&D and Emissions Taxation," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 19(2), pages 1-10, June.
    7. Rishi Basak & Sylvia Karlsson‐Vinkhuyzen & Katrien J. A. M. Termeer, 2022. "Information for climate finance accountability regimes: Proposed framework and case study of the Green Climate Fund," Public Administration & Development, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(5), pages 261-280, December.
    8. Eduardo Ortas & Isabel Gallego‐Alvarez & Igor Álvarez Etxeberria, 2015. "Financial Factors Influencing the Quality of Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management Disclosure: A Quantile Regression Approach," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 22(6), pages 362-380, November.
    9. Patrice Loisel & Bernard Elyakime, 2006. "Incentive Contract and Weather Risk," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 35(2), pages 99-108, October.
    10. Patrice Loisel & Bernard Elyakime, 2018. "Incentives under Upstream-Downstream Moral Hazard Contract," Post-Print halshs-01649804, HAL.
    11. Frank Hartmann & Paolo Perego & Anna Young, 2013. "Carbon Accounting: Challenges for Research in Management Control and Performance Measurement," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 49(4), pages 539-563, December.
    12. Zabel, Astrid & Roe, Brian, 2009. "Optimal design of pro-conservation incentives," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 126-134, November.
    13. Alonso-Paulí, Eduard & André, Francisco J., 2015. "Standardized environmental management systems as an internal management tool," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 85-106.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Goldsmith, Peter D. & Basak, Rishi, 1999. "Environmental Performance Indicators And Executive-Employee Risk Sharing," 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN 21546, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    2. Laurent Franckx & Alessio D'Amato, 2003. "Environmental policy as a multi-task principal-agent problem," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0312, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    3. Patrice Loisel & Bernard Elyakime, 2018. "Incentives under Upstream-Downstream Moral Hazard Contract," Post-Print halshs-01649804, HAL.
    4. de, Vries Frans & Franckx, Laurent, 2012. "A Note on Organizational Design and the Optimal Allocation of Environmental Liability," Stirling Economics Discussion Papers 2012-09, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
    5. Daron Acemoglu & Alp Simsek, 2010. "Moral Hazard and Efficiency in General Equilibrium with Anonymous Trading," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000232, David K. Levine.
    6. Laurent Franckx & Frans P. Vries & Ben White, 2022. "A note on organizational structure and environmental liability," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 24(2), pages 173-193, April.
    7. Armin Schmutzler, 2001. "Environmental Regulations and Managerial Myopia," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 18(1), pages 87-100, January.
    8. Andrew Keeler, 1995. "Regulatory objectives and enforcement behavior," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 6(1), pages 73-85, July.
    9. Goldsmith, Peter D. & Turan, Nesve A. & Gow, Hamish R., 2004. "Firms, Incentives, And The Supply Of Food Safety: A Formal Model Of Government Enforcement," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20343, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    10. Laurent Franckx & F.P. de Vries, 2004. "Environmental Liability and Organizational Structure," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0401, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    11. Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard, 2021. "Green human resource management – A personnel economics perspective," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    12. Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard, 1994. "La mise en vigueur des politiques environnementales et l’organisation de la firme," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 70(2), pages 211-224, juin.
    13. Tom Tietenberg, 1998. "Disclosure Strategies for Pollution Control," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 587-602, April.
    14. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2004. "Corporate Strategies For Managing Environmental Risk (The International Library Of Environmental Economics And Policy – Volume xx)," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-43, CIRANO.
    15. Aggarwal, Rimjhim & Lichtenberg, Erik, 2001. "Environmental Regulation In Vertically Coordinated Industries," Working Papers 28562, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    16. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2000. "Environmental Risk Management and the Business Firm," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-23, CIRANO.
    17. Jiao Wang & Lima Zhao & Arnd Huchzermeier, 2021. "Operations‐Finance Interface in Risk Management: Research Evolution and Opportunities," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(2), pages 355-389, February.
    18. Armin Schmutzler, 1996. "Pollution control with imperfectly observable emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 7(3), pages 251-262, April.
    19. Marcelo Bianconi, 2004. "Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Risk and the Behavior of Individual Preferences under Moral Hazard," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0410, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
    20. Arantxa Jarque, 2010. "Hidden effort, learning by doing, and wage dynamics," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 96(4Q), pages 339-372.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:20:y:2001:i:4:p:259-279. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.