IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/ejlwec/v45y2018i2d10.1007_s10657-016-9537-0.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Empirical assessment of the role of economic analysis in the Russian antitrust: Why is economic analysis used?

Author

Listed:
  • Anastasia Shastitko

    (Lomonosov Moscow State University
    Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration)

Abstract

Economic analysis is an important tool for the modern antitrust. This article provides an empirical study of its role in the Russian antitrust law enforcement practice in order to answer the following question: Has the understanding of the usefulness and importance of economic analysis in the Russian antitrust been achieved, or has economic analysis been applied formally? The study is based on the sample of official records on published decisions by the Supreme Court of Arbitration of the Russian Federation, created specifically for this research.

Suggested Citation

  • Anastasia Shastitko, 2018. "Empirical assessment of the role of economic analysis in the Russian antitrust: Why is economic analysis used?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 313-330, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:45:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10657-016-9537-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-016-9537-0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10657-016-9537-0
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10657-016-9537-0?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stephen Breyer, 2009. "Economic Reasoning and Judicial Review," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(535), pages 123-135, February.
    2. Stephen Breyer, 2009. "Economic Reasoning and Judicial Review," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(535), pages 123-135, February.
    3. Avdasheva, Svetlana & Kryuchkova, Polina, 2015. "The ‘reactive’ model of antitrust enforcement: When private interests dictate enforcement actions – The Russian case," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 200-208.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Svetlana Avdasheva & Svetlana Golovanova & Elena Sidorova, 2022. "Does judicial effort matter for quality? Evidence from antitrust proceedings in Russian commercial courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 425-450, June.
    2. Yannis Katsoulacos & Svetlana Avdasheva & Svetlana Golovanova, 2021. "Determinants of the (Slow) Development of Effect-Based Competition Enforcement: Testing the Impact of Judicial Review on the Choice of Legal Standards by Competition Authorities," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 103-122, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2011. "Great Expectations: Law, Employment Contracts, and Labor Market Performance," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 18, pages 1591-1696, Elsevier.
    2. Patrice Bougette & Oliver Budzinski & Frédéric Marty, 2019. "Exploitative Abuse and Abuse of Economic Dependence: What Can We Learn From an Industrial Organization Approach?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 129(2), pages 261-286.
    3. Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "Würde eine unabhängige europäische Wettbewerbsbehörde eine bessere Wettbewerbspolitik machen?," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 78, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    4. Bougette, Patrice & Deschamps, Marc & Marty, Frédéric, 2015. "When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law," Enterprise & Society, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 313-353, June.
    5. Oliver Budzinski, 2010. "An Institutional Analysis of the Enforcement Problems in Merger Control," Working Papers 101/10, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
    6. Jürgen-Peter Kretschmer, 2014. "How to deal with resale price maintenance: What can we learn from empirical results?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 343-368, October.
    7. Budzinski Oliver & Kuchinke Björn A., 2012. "Deal or No Deal? Consensual Arrangements as an Instrument of European Competition Policy," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 63(3), pages 265-292, December.
    8. Budzinski, Oliver & Haucap, Justus, 2019. "Kartellrecht und Ökonomik: Institutions matter!," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 102, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    9. Oliver Budzinski, 2009. "Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits," Working Papers 93/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
    10. Cao, Siying, 2022. "Quantifying Economic Reasoning in Court: Judge Economics Sophistication and Pro-business Orientation," Working Papers 321, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    11. Shastitko, Anastasia A. (Шаститко, Анастасия), 2017. "Interrelationship between Economic Theory and Competition Policy [Взаимное Влияние Экономической Теории И Конкурентной Политики]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 4, pages 154-167, August.
    12. Haucap, Justus, 2010. "Eingeschränkte Rationalität in der Wettbewerbsökonomie," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 08, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    13. Grajzl, Peter & Baniak, Andrzej, 2018. "Private enforcement, corruption, and antitrust design," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 284-307.
    14. Andrey Shastitko & Claude Ménard & Natalia Pavlova, 2018. "The curse of antitrust facing bilateral monopoly: Is regulation hopeless?," Russian Journal of Economics, ARPHA Platform, vol. 4(2), pages 175-196, June.
    15. Svetlana Avdasheva & Dina Tsytsulina & Svetlana Golovanova & Yelena Sidorova, 2015. "Discovering the Miracle of Large Numbers of Antitrust Investigations in Russia: The Role of Competition Authority Incentives," HSE Working papers WP BRP 26/PA/2015, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    16. Шаститко А. Е. & Павлова Н. С., 2021. "Антиконкурентные Последствия Антимонопольной Политики: Кейс Мобильных Операторов," Вопросы государственного и муниципального управления // Public administration issues, НИУ ВШЭ, issue 2, pages 7-33.
    17. Avdasheva, Svetlana (Авдашева, Светлана) & Shastitko, Andrei (Шаститко, Андрей), 2015. "Alleged Infringement: The Time of Announcement Does Matter [Предмет Обвинения: Время Объявления Имеет Значение]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 72-91, February.
    18. Сидорова Е. Е., 2019. "Оценка Качества Работы Судей В Контексте Антимонопольного Регулирования," Вопросы государственного и муниципального управления // Public administration issues, НИУ ВШЭ, issue 3, pages 67-87.
    19. Svetlana Avdasheva & Svetlana Golovanova & Elena Sidorova, 2022. "Does judicial effort matter for quality? Evidence from antitrust proceedings in Russian commercial courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 425-450, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antitrust policy; Economic analysis; Empirical study;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:45:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10657-016-9537-0. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.