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Discovering the Miracle of Large Numbers of Antitrust Investigations in Russia: The Role of Competition Authority Incentives

Author

Listed:
  • Svetlana Avdasheva

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Dina Tsytsulina

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Svetlana Golovanova

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Yelena Sidorova

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

Many antitrust investigations in Russia continue to present a challenge for the assessment of competition policy and international enforcement ratings. On the one hand, many infringement decisions may be interpreted as an indicator of high enforcement efforts in the context of rigid competition restrictions and the significant related harm to social welfare. On the other hand, many investigations proceed under poor legal and economic standards; therefore, the impact of decisions and remedies on competition is questionable. In fact, large number of investigations may indicate the ineffectiveness of antitrust enforcement. The article explains the possible effects of antitrust enforcement in Russia. Using a unique dataset of the appeals of infringement decisions from 2008-2012, we classify the investigated cases according to their potential impact on competition. A case-level analysis reveals that the majority of cases would never be investigated under an appropriate understanding of the goals of antitrust enforcement, restrictions on competition and basic cost-benefit assessments of agency activity. There are diverse explanations for the distorted structure of enforcement, including the incompleteness and imperfection of sector-specific regulations, rules concerning citizen complaints against the executive authorities and the incentives of competition authorities. Our analysis shows that competition agencies tend to pay more attention to the investigation of cases, which requires less input and, at the same time, results in infringement decisions with a lower probability of being annulled

Suggested Citation

  • Svetlana Avdasheva & Dina Tsytsulina & Svetlana Golovanova & Yelena Sidorova, 2015. "Discovering the Miracle of Large Numbers of Antitrust Investigations in Russia: The Role of Competition Authority Incentives," HSE Working papers WP BRP 26/PA/2015, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:26/pa/2015
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Andrey V. Makarov, 2016. "Anti-Competitive Agreements in Russian Courts (2008 - 2012): Antitrust Law Implementation and Interpetation," HSE Working papers WP BRP 67/LAW/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    2. John Davies, 2018. "‘Outcome’ Assessment: What Exactly Are We Measuring? A Personal Reflection on Measuring the Outcomes from Competition Agencies’ Interventions," De Economist, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 7-22, March.
    3. Andrey V. Makarov, 2014. "Comparative Analusis Of Antitrust Policy Against Collusion In Some Transition Economies: Challenges For Effectiveness," HSE Working papers WP BRP 20/PA/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    4. Pavlova, Natalia & Shastitko, Andrey, 2016. "Leniency programs and socially beneficial cooperation: Effects of type I errors," Russian Journal of Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 375-401.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    antitrust enforcement; authorities’ incentives; harm; Russia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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