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Alleged Infringement: The Time of Announcement Does Matter
[Предмет Обвинения: Время Объявления Имеет Значение]

Author

Listed:
  • Avdasheva, Svetlana (Авдашева, Светлана)

    (Faculty of Economic Science, National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Shastitko, Andrei (Шаститко, Андрей)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

Abstract

Discretion in choosing the type of violation after administrative investigation decreases the incentives of alleged violator to produce and present evidence in his favor in the process of investigation, and at the same time increases the expenditure of those who decide to spend resources on presenting evidence. Responsible authority however might be interested in the system of discretionary choice of the type of violation at the late stage of investigation, if performance indicators directly or indirectly rely on the infringement decisions made. One implication of the analysis is doubts on the effectiveness of the antitrust compliance programs developed by companies, which should be subject of the same type of uncertainty about the alleged law violation.

Suggested Citation

  • Avdasheva, Svetlana (Авдашева, Светлана) & Shastitko, Andrei (Шаститко, Андрей), 2015. "Alleged Infringement: The Time of Announcement Does Matter [Предмет Обвинения: Время Объявления Имеет Значение]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 72-91, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1512
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    References listed on IDEAS

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