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An economic approach on countering the misuse of the right to challenge judges: an experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Joep Sonnemans

    (University of Amsterdam)

  • Frans Dijk

    (Netherlands Council for the Judiciary)

  • Bart Donders

    (University of Amsterdam)

  • Eddy Bauw

    (Utrecht University)

Abstract

Parties can challenge a judge (request a recusal) when they have reasons to believe that a judge is not impartial. In practice this procedure is sometimes abused by lawyers who, for example, want to delay proceedings. Countries have taken different measures to deter the improper use of the procedure to request a recusal, like fines for dismissed requests, or immediately dismissing evidently unfounded requests. In a laboratory experiment we examine the effects of a summary review whether a challenge is evidently unfounded, with or without fines. We find that a review without fine improves legal protection in practice as well as efficiency by reducing unfounded challenges and increasing challenges that have a substantial chance of success. Overall the number of challenges declines. With a fine, challenges decline, but also legal protection.

Suggested Citation

  • Joep Sonnemans & Frans Dijk & Bart Donders & Eddy Bauw, 2018. "An economic approach on countering the misuse of the right to challenge judges: an experiment," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 29-57, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:45:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10657-016-9539-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-016-9539-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nadège Bault & Giorgio Coricelli & Aldo Rustichini, 2008. "Interdependent Utilities: How Social Ranking Affects Choice Behavior," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 3(10), pages 1-10, October.
    2. Gneezy, Uri & Rustichini, Aldo, 2000. "A Fine is a Price," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 1-17, January.
    3. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    4. Frechette, Guillaume R. & Schotter, Andrew (ed.), 2015. "Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195328325.
    5. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gregory DeAngelo & Bryan C. McCannon, 2019. "Political competition in judge and prosecutor elections," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 167-193, October.
    2. Alain Marciano & Giovanni Ramello & Hans-Bernd Schaefer, 2020. "Foreword, special issue: economic analysis of litigations 2," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 1-5, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Challenge judges; Improper use; Experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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