The case against lawyers’ contingent fees and the misapplication of principal-agent models
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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-011-9243-x
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Cited by:
- Ramello, Giovanni B., 2012.
"Aggregate litigation and regulatory innovation: Another view of judicial efficiency,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 63-71.
- Giovanni Battista Ramello, 2011. "Aggregate litigation and regulatory innovation: another view of judicial efficiency," ICER Working Papers 24-2011, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- Ramello, Giovanni B., 2012. "Aggregate Litigation and Regulatory Innovation: Another View of Judicial Efficiency," IEL Working Papers 8, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
- Juergen Backhaus & Alberto Cassone & Giovanni Ramello, 2011. "The law and economics of class actions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 165-168, October.
- Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais, 2011.
"Informational externalities and settlements in mass tort litigations,"
European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 241-262, October.
- Deffains, Bruno & Langlais, Eric, 2010. "Informational Externalities and Settlements in Mass Tort Litigations," MPRA Paper 23016, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais, 2011. "Informational Externalities and Settlements in Mass Tort Litigations," Working Papers hal-04141000, HAL.
- Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais, 2011. "Informational Externalities and Settlements in Mass Tort Litigations," EconomiX Working Papers 2011-14, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Thomas Ulen, 2011. "An introduction to the law and economics of class action litigation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 185-203, October.
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More about this item
Keywords
Contingent fees; Principal-agent; Incomplete contracts; Authority; Professional ethics; Fiduciary duties; Conformist preferences; L14; L84; K12; D64; D86; J44;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L84 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Personal, Professional, and Business Services
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
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