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Punching above One’s Weight–On Overcommitment in Election Campaigns

Author

Listed:
  • Marco A. Haan

    (University of Groningen)

  • Sander Onderstal

    (University of Amsterdam)

  • Yohanes E. Riyanto

    (Nanyang Technological University)

Abstract

In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model to study how candidates compete in elections when voters care about the winner’s ability to implement policies. In our model, the candidates make commitments before the election regarding the plans they will try to implement if elected. These commitments serve as a signal of ability. In equilibrium, candidates make overambitious promises. While the candidate with the highest ability wins, the electorate may be better off having a random candidate implement her best plan, rather than seeing the winner implementing an overambitious plan.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco A. Haan & Sander Onderstal & Yohanes E. Riyanto, 2024. "Punching above One’s Weight–On Overcommitment in Election Campaigns," De Economist, Springer, vol. 172(2), pages 121-139, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:decono:v:172:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s10645-024-09435-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s10645-024-09435-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Election promises; Signalling; Overcommitment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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