Selection vs. accountability: An experimental investigation of campaign promises in a moral-hazard environment
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.03.008
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Alexandru Savu, 2024. "Intergovernmental alignment and the electoral value of mayors: reverse coattails in an unexpected technocracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(1), pages 43-64, July.
- Lang, Matthias & Schudy, Simeon, 2023.
"(Dis)honesty and the value of transparency for campaign promises,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
- Matthias Lang & Simeon Schudy, 2020. "(Dis)honesty and the Value of Transparency for Campaign Promises," CESifo Working Paper Series 8366, CESifo.
- Matthias Lang & Simeon Schudy, 2023. "(Dis)honesty and the Value of Transparency for Campaign Promises," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 409, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Matthieß, Theres, 2020. "Retrospective pledge voting: A comparative study of the electoral consequences of government parties’ pledge fulfilment," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 59(4), pages 774-796.
- Fehrler, Sebastian & Fischbacher, Urs & Schneider, Maik T., 2016.
"Who Runs? Honesty and Self-Selection into Politics,"
IZA Discussion Papers
10258, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Fehrler, Sebastian & Fischbacher, Urs & Schneider, Maik, 2017. "Who Runs? Honesty and Self-Selection into Politics," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168083, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Marco A. Haan & Sander Onderstal & Yohanes E. Riyanto, 2024. "Punching above One’s Weight–On Overcommitment in Election Campaigns," De Economist, Springer, vol. 172(2), pages 121-139, June.
- Kaisa Herne & Olli Lappalainen & Maija Setälä & Juha Ylisalo, 2022. "Accountability as a Warrant for Trust: An Experiment on Sanctions and Justifications in a Trust Game," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(4), pages 615-648, November.
- Du, Ninghua & Shahriar, Quazi, 2024. "Information disclosure in mitigating moral hazard: An experimental investigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 284-299.
- Kai A. Konrad & Raisa Sherif, 2019. "Sanctioning, selection, and pivotality in voting: theory and experimental results," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 330-357, September.
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More about this item
Keywords
Retrospective voting; Prospective voting; Political economy; Cheap talk; Corruption;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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