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Classification of preferential ballot voting methods

Author

Listed:
  • Amir Babak Aazami

    (Duke University)

  • Hubert Lewis Bray

    (Duke University)

Abstract

We examine 17 preferential ballot voting methods using three criteria: (1) mathematical properties, (2) game-theoretic considerations, and (3) practical real-world outcomes. The challenge of comparing and contrasting the real-world outcomes of different voting methods is the sheer number of possible elections that can exist. We combat this challenge by introducing a new way of visualizing outcomes in what we dub a “DNA sequence” for each voting method.

Suggested Citation

  • Amir Babak Aazami & Hubert Lewis Bray, 2023. "Classification of preferential ballot voting methods," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 510-523, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:34:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s10602-022-09384-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09384-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brams, Steven J & Nagel, Jack H, 1991. "Approval Voting in Practice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 71(1-2), pages 1-17, August.
    2. James Green-Armytage & T. Tideman & Rafael Cosman, 2016. "Statistical evaluation of voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 183-212, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Preferential ballot voting methods; mathematical properties; game theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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