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What difference does a voting rule make?

Author

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  • Chang Geun Song

    (Virginia Tech
    Sungkyunkwan University)

Abstract

Abstract Using data from Politbarometer surveys and from local American elections in which voters ranked candidates, this paper estimates the frequencies with which different pairs of voting rules yield different outcomes from the same ballots. The frequencies vary widely over pairs of rules, from 0.39% for the pair Minimax and STAR to 24.41% for the pair Plurality and Approval. The paper also checked for Condorcet winners. There were Condorcet winners in all of the 115 elections examined and in all but one of the 1,022 surveys examined.

Suggested Citation

  • Chang Geun Song, 2023. "What difference does a voting rule make?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 275-285, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:34:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s10602-022-09375-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09375-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James Green-Armytage & T. Tideman & Rafael Cosman, 2016. "Statistical evaluation of voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 183-212, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ross Hyman & Deb Otis & Seamus Allen & Greg Dennis, 2023. "A Majority Rule Philosophy for Instant Runoff Voting," Papers 2308.08430, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    2. Rida Laraki, 2023. "Electoral reform: the case for majority judgment," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 346-356, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting Systems; Condorcet; Actual election; Ordinal Ranking Data;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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