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STAR Voting, equality of voice, and voter satisfaction: considerations for voting method reform

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  • Sara Wolk
  • Jameson Quinn
  • Marcus Ogren

Abstract

The vote itself forms the foundation of our political discourse, and how we vote may be the single most important decision in a representative democracy. In the pursuit of more fair and representative elections, we explore common electoral pathologies like vote-splitting, Favorite Betrayal, and the center-squeeze Spoiler Effect, and discuss criteria and methodology for evaluating voting method quality. We introduce STAR Voting for consideration in place of Plurality and Instant Runoff Voting for governmental elections, and compare it to other leading voting method proposals. To evaluate voting method accuracy and strategy resilience, we present the metrics Voter Satisfaction Efficiency (VSE) and Pivotal Voter Strategic Incentive (PVSI). We find that compared to Plurality Voting, all methods tested substantially reduce the need for voters to consider candidate electability but that STAR Voting, Smith/Minimax, the Condorcet method included, and Approval Top Two go further to ensure an equally weighted vote. We conclude that STAR Voting in particular offers a viable, competitive, and compelling proposal for more representative elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Sara Wolk & Jameson Quinn & Marcus Ogren, 2023. "STAR Voting, equality of voice, and voter satisfaction: considerations for voting method reform," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 310-334, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:34:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s10602-022-09389-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09389-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Marcus Ogren, 2023. "Candidate Incentive Distributions: How voting methods shape electoral incentives," Papers 2306.07147, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting system; Expected social utility; One person one vote; Strategic voting; Cardinal preferences; Ranked choice voting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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