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The King Never Emigrates

Author

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  • Gil S. Epstein
  • Arye L. Hillman
  • Heinrich W. Ursprung

Abstract

This paper uses a locational model of rent‐seeking to describe incentives to emigrate. A country is considered in which how a person fares in privileged income redistribution is determined by proximity to a king. Contests for privilege determine whether the more or the less productive in the population are located closer to the king. A distinction is drawn between contests for privilege that are “easy” and “difficult.” When contests are “easy,” the more productive are furthest from the king and emigrate first. When contests are “difficult,” the least productive emigrate first. In either case, the population begins to unravel.

Suggested Citation

  • Gil S. Epstein & Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1999. "The King Never Emigrates," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 107-121, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:3:y:1999:i:2:p:107-121
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9361.00055
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    Cited by:

    1. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2016. "Where are the rent seekers?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 124-141, June.
    2. Docquier, Frédéric & Lodigiani, Elisabetta & Rapoport, Hillel & Schiff, Maurice, 2016. "Emigration and democracy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 209-223.
    3. Arye Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "The social cost of contestable benefits," CIRANO Working Papers 2017s-11, CIRANO.
    4. Gil S. Epstein, 2003. "Labor Market Interactions Between Legal and Illegal Immigrants," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 30-43, February.
    5. Arye L. Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "Rent Seeking: The Social Cost of Contestable Benefits," CESifo Working Paper Series 6462, CESifo.
    6. Baran Siyahhan & Hamed Ghoddusi, 2022. "Optimal investment in human capital under migration uncertainty," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 422-449, May.
    7. Docquier, Frederic & Rapoport, Hillel, 2003. "Ethnic discrimination and the migration of skilled labor," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 159-172, February.
    8. Hefeker Carsten & Potrafke Niklas, 2021. "Heinrich W. Ursprung – Herausragender Ökonom, Mentor und Ratgeber," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 22(4), pages 370-374, November.
    9. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2000. "Political culture and economic decline," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 219-243, Springer.
    10. Arye L. Hillman, 2021. "Heinrich Ursprung: a scholarly life," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 305-312, December.
    11. Matthew D. Mitchell, 2019. "Uncontestable favoritism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 167-190, October.
    12. Naiditch, Claire & Vranceanu, Radu, 2010. "Equilibrium migration with invested remittances: The EECA evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 454-474, December.
    13. Gradstein, Mark, 2004. "Voting on meritocracy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 797-803, August.
    14. Ira N. Gang & Gil S. Epstein, 2002. "Rent Seeking in Hierarchical Firms," Departmental Working Papers 200218, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    15. Hansen, Jorgen Drud, 2003. "Immigration and income redistribution in welfare states," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 735-746, November.
    16. Wilson, John Douglas, 2011. "Brain-drain taxes for non-benevolent governments," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 68-76, May.
    17. Z. Eylem Gevrek & Pinar Kunt & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2021. "Education, political discontent, and emigration intentions: evidence from a natural experiment in Turkey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(3), pages 563-585, March.
    18. Hillman, Arye L. & Epstein, Gil S, 2000. "Social Harmony At The Boundaries Of The Welfare State: Immigrants And Social Transfers," CEPR Discussion Papers 2414, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Roger D. Congleton, 2020. "Governance by true believers: supreme duties with and without totalitarianism," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 111-141, March.
    20. Epstein, Gil S. & Hillman, Arye L., 2003. "Unemployed immigrants and voter sentiment in the welfare state," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1641-1655, August.
    21. Schiff, Maurice, 2002. "Love thy neighbor: trade, migration, and social capital," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 87-107, March.
    22. Hillman, Arye L. & Swank, Otto, 2000. "Why political culture should be in the lexicon of economics," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 1-4, March.
    23. Baochun Peng, 2009. "Rent‐seeking activities and the ‘brain gain’ effects of migration," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 42(4), pages 1561-1577, November.

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