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Political importance and its relation to the federal prosecution of public corruption

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  • Jamie Bologna Pavlik

    (Texas Tech University)

Abstract

In the US, federal prosecutors are appointed by the president, confirmed by the Senate, and have significant discretion over which cases they choose to take to court. Federal prosecutors handling an overwhelming majority of corruption cases invites the possibility of political influence in the monitoring of corruption. Additionally, political disparities across states may result in differences in corrupt behavior. Using individual case level data, I examine the effect political factors have on federal corruption cases, with an emphasis on states that are an important focus in the next presidential election. I find that corruption convictions tend to be higher in politically important states. This effect seems more significant when Democratic administrations are in power. In addition, it seems that these effects are relevant only for corruption crimes labeled as “federal”.

Suggested Citation

  • Jamie Bologna Pavlik, 2017. "Political importance and its relation to the federal prosecution of public corruption," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 346-372, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:28:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s10602-017-9243-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-017-9243-0
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    Cited by:

    1. Boland, Matthew & Godsell, David, 2021. "Bureaucratic discretion and contracting outcomes," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    2. Lewis Davis & K. R. White, 2021. "Is justice blind? Evidence from federal corruption convictions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(1), pages 63-95, January.
    3. Justin T. Callais & Jamie Bologna Pavlik, 2023. "Does economic freedom lighten the blow? Evidence from the great recession in the United States," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 357-398, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Corruption convictions; Political bias; Prosecutorial incentives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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